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Florida v. Jardines
11-564
Ruling Below: lardines v. State, 73 So.3d 34 (Fla. 2011), cert. granted in part, Florida v.
lardines, 11-564 (132 S.Ct. 995).
In 2006, police received a tip that Joelis Jm'dines was using his home as a place to grow
marijuana. The police took a drug-sniffing dog to his door and when it had indicated that it
smelled drugs a police officer approached the door and smelled marijuana. The police obtained a
search warrant and later found several marijuana plants inside Jardines' home. Jardines was
charged with drug trafficking and other charges. In 2007, Jardines filed a Motion to Suppress
Items Seized from His Home arguing that the use of the dog was an unreasonable search. The
court granted the motion and the State appealed. The District Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that the use of the dog did not constitute a search.
Question Presented: Whether a "sniff test" by a drug detection dog conducted at the front door
of a private residence is a "search" under the Fourth Amendment.

Joelis JARDINES, Petitioner,

v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Supreme Court of Florida
Decided April 14, 2011
[Excerpt: Some footnote and citation omitted.]
PERRY, J.

contraband.

I. BACKGROUND

The handler told the detective that the dog
had a positive alert for the odor of narcotics.
The detective went up to the front door for
the first time, and smelled marijuana.

On November 3, 2006, Detective Pedraja of
the
Miami-Dade
Police
Department
received an unverified "crime stoppers" tip
that the home of Joelis Jardines was being
used to grow marijuana. One month later, on
December 6, 2006, Detective Pedraja and
Detective Bartlet and his drug detection dog,
Franky, approached the residence.
The handler placed the dog on a leash and
accompanied the dog up to the front door of
the home. The dog alerted to the scent of

The detective prepared an affidavit and
applied for a search warrant, which was
issued. A search was conducted, which
confirmed that marijuana was being grown
inside the home. The defendant was
arrested.
The defendant moved to suppress the
evidence seized at his home. The trial cOUli
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conducted an evidentiary hearing at which
the detective and the dog handler testified.
The trial court suppressed the evidence on
authority of State v. Rabb.
The State appealed the suppression ruling,
and the district court reversed based on the
following reasoning:
In sum, we reverse the order
suppressing the evidence at issue.
We conclude that no illegal search
occurred. The officer had the right to
go up to defendant's front door.
Contrary to the holding in Rabb, a
warrant was not necessary for the
drug dog sniff, and the officer's sniff
at the exterior door of defendant's
home should not have been viewed
as "fruit of the poisonous tree." The
trial judge should have concluded
substantial evidence suppOlied the
magistrate's
determination
that
probable cause existed. Moreover,
the evidence at issue should not have
been
suppressed
because
its
discovery was inevitable. To the
extent our analysis conflicts with
Rabb, we certify direct conflict.

violated, and no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV. With respect to the
meaning of the amendment, the courts have
come to accept the formulation set forth by
Justice Harlan in Katz:
As the Court's opinion states, "the
Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places." The question, however,
is what protection it affords to those
people. Generally, as here, the
answer to that question requires
reference to
a "place." My
1Inderstanding of the rule that has
emerged.fi'om prior decisions is that
there is a !vvofold req1lirement, first
that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and, secone/, that the
expectation be one that society is
prepared
to
recognize
as
"reasonable. "
A. Federal "Dog Sniff" Cases

Jm'dines sought review in this Court based
on certified conflict with State v. Rabb, 920
So.2d 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), which we
granted.
II. THE APPLICABLE LAW
The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution contains both the Search and
Seizure Clause and the Warrant Clause and
provides as follows in full:
The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects,
against
unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be

The United States Supreme Court has
addressed the issue of "sniff tests" by drug
detection dogs. First, in United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), that Court
addressed the issue of whether police, based
on reasonable suspicion, could temporarily
seize a piece of luggage at an airport and
then subject the luggage to a "sniff test" by a
drug detection dog. After Place's behavior at
an airport aroused suspicion, police seized
his luggage and subjected it to a "sniff test"
by a drug detection dog at another airport
and ultimately discovered cocaine inside.
The federal district couli denied Place's
motion to suppress, and the court of appeals
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reversed. The United States Supreme Court
affirmed, concluding that the seizure, which
lasted ninety minutes, was an impermissibly
long Terry stop, but the COUli ruled as
follows with respect to the dog "sniff test":
The FOUlih Amendment "protects people
from unreasonable government intrusions
into their legitimate expectations of
privacy." We have affirmed that a person
possesses a privacy interest in the contents
of personal luggage that is protected by the
Fourth Amendment. A "canine sniff' by a
well-trained narcotics
detection dog,
however, does not require opening the
luggage. It does not expose noncontraband
items that otherwise would remain hidden
from public view, as does, for example, an
officer's rummaging through the contents of
the luggage. Thus, the manner in which
information IS obtained through this
investigative technique is much less
intrusive than a typical search. Moreover,
the sniff discloses only the presence or
absence of narcotics, a contraband item.
Thus, despite the fact that the sniff tells the
authorities something about the contents of
the luggage, the information obtained is
limited. This limited disclosure also ensures
that the owner of the property is not
subjected to the embarrassment and
inconvenience entailed in less discriminate
and more intrusive investigative methods.
In these respects, the canine sniff is s1li
generis. We are aware of no other
investigative procedure that is so limited
both in the manner in which the information
is obtained and in the content of the
information revealed by the procedure.
Therefore, we conclude that the particular
course of investigation that the agents
intended to pursue here-exposure of
respondent's luggage, which was located in
a public place, to a trained canine-did not
constitute a "search" within the meaning of

the Fourth Amendment.
Second, in City of Indianapolis v. Edmon(l,
531 U.S. 32 (2000), the United States
Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether police could stop a vehicle at a drug
interdiction checkpoint and subject the
exterior of the vehicle to a "sniff test" by a
drug detection dog. Police stopped Edmond
and other motorists at a dragnet-style drug
interdiction checkpoint, and a drug detection
dog was walked around the exterior of each
vehicle. Later, Edmond filed a class action
lawsuit against the city, claiming that the
checkpoints violated his FOUlih Amendment
rights, and he sought a preliminary
injunction barring the practice. The federal
district court denied the injunction, and the
court of appeals reversed. The United States
Supreme Court affirmed, explaining that
"[w]e have never approved a checkpoint
program whose primary purpose was to
detect evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing." Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41, 121
S.Ct. 447. With respect to the dog "sniff
test," the Court stated as follows:
It is well established that a vehicle stop at a
highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. The fact that officers walk a
narcotics-detection dog around the exterior
of each car at the Indianapolis checkpoints
does not transform the seizure into a search.
Just as in Place, an exterior sniff of an
automobile does not require entry into the
car and is not designed to disclose any
information other than the presence or
absence of narcotics. Like the dog sniff in
Place, a sniff by a dog that simply walks
around a car is "much less intrusive than a
typical search."

B. Two Additional Federal Cases
In two additional cases, the United States
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Supreme Court has addressed Fourth
Amendment issues that are relevant here.
First, in United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
109 (1984), the Court addressed the issue of
whether police, without a showing of
probable cause, could temporarily seize and
inspect a small portion of the contents of a
package, which had been damaged in transit
and was being held by a private shipping
company, and then subject the contents to a
field test for cocaine. After employees of a
private freight carrier discovered a
suspicious white powder in a damaged
package and notified federal agents, the
agents conducted a field chemical test on the
powder and determined that it was cocaine.
The federal district court denied Jacobsen's
motion to suppress, and the court of appeals
reversed. The United States Supreme Court
reversed, reasoning as follows:
A chemical test that merely discloses
whether or not a particular substance
is cocaine does not compromise any
legitimate interest in privacy. This
conclusion is not dependent on the
result of any particular test. It is
probably safe to assume that
virtually all of the tests conducted
under circumstances comparable to
those disclosed by this record would
result in a positive finding; in such
cases, no legitimate interest has been
compromised. But even if the results
are negative-merely disclosing that
the substance is something other than
cocaine-such a result reveals
nothing of special interest. Congress
has decided-and there IS no
question about its power to do so-to
treat the interest in "privately"
possessing cocaine as illegitimate;
thus governmental conduct that can
reveal whether a substance is
coca me, and no other arguably
"private" fact, compromises no

legitimate privacy interest.
This conclusion is dictated by United States
v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), in which the
Court held that subjecting luggage to a
"sniff test" by a trained narcotics detection
dog was not a "search" within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. ...
Here, as in Place, the likelihood that official
conduct of the kind disclosed by the record
will actually compromise any legitimate
interest in privacy seems much too remote to
characterize the testing as a search subject to
the Fourth Amendment.
And second, in Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27 (2001), the United States Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether police,
without a warrant, could use a thermalimaging device to scan a private home to
determine if the amount of heat generated by
the home was consistent with the use of
high-intensity lamps used in growing
marijuana. After federal agents became
SUSpICIOUS that Kyllo was growing
marijuana in his home, agents scanned the
outside of the triplex with a thermal-imaging
device, which showed that the garage roof
and side of the residence were inordinately
warm. The agents obtained a warrant and
searched the residence and found live
marijuana plants inside. The federal district
court denied Kyllo's motion to suppress, and
the circuit court affirmed. The United States
Supreme Court reversed, reasoning as
follows:

Katz
test-whether
the
The
individual has an expectation of
privacy that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable-has often
been criticized as circular, and hence
subjective and unpredictable. While
it may be difficult to refine Katz
when the search of areas such as
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telephone booths, automobiles, or
even the curtilage and uncovered
portions of residences is at issue, in
the case of the search of the interior
of homes-the prototypical and
hence most commonly litigated area
of protected privacy-there is a
ready criterion, with roots deep in
the common law, of the minimal
expectation of privacy that exists,
and that is acknowledged to be
reasonable. To withdraw protection
of this minimum expectation would
be to permit police technology to
erode the privacy guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment. We think that
obtaining
by
sense-enhancing
technology
any
information
regarding the interior of the home
that could not otherwise have been
obtained without physical "intrusion
into a constitutionally protected
area" constitutes a search-at least
where (as here) the technology in
question is not in general public use.
This assures preservation of that
of
privacy
against
degree
government that existed when the
Fourth Amendment was adopted. On
the basis of this criterion, the
information obtained by the thermal
imager in this case was the product
ofa search ....
We have said that the Fourth Amendment
draws "a firm line at the entrance to the
house." That line, we think, must be not
only firm but also bright-which requires
clear specification of those methods of
surveillance that require a warrant. While it
is certainly possible to conclude from the
videotape of the thermal imaging that
occurred in this case that no "significant"
compromise of the homeowner's privacy
has occurred, we must take the long view,
from the original meaning of the Fourth

Amendment forward.
"The Fourth Amendment is to be construed
in the light of what was deemed an
unreasonable search and seizure when it was
adopted, and in a manner which will
conserve public interests as well as the
interests and rights of individual citizens."
Where, as here, the Government uses a
device that is not in general public use, to
explore details of the home that would
previously have been unknowable without
physical intrusion, the surveillance is a
"search" and is presumptively unreasonable
without a warrant.
III. ANALYSIS

As noted above, the issue raised in the
present case is whether a "sniff test" by a
drug detection dog conducted at the front
door of a private residence is a "search"
under the Fourth Amendment.

A. The Federal "Dog Sniff' Cases Are
Inapplicable to the Home
For reasons explained below, we conclude
that the analysis used in the above federal
"dog sniff' cases is inapplicable to a "sniff
test" conducted at a private home. First, we
recognize that the United States Supreme
Court has ruled that because a "sniff test"
conducted by a drug detection dog is "sui
generis," or unique, in the sense that it is
minimally intrusive and is designed to detect
only illicit drugs and nothing more, Place,
462 U.S. at 707, a dog "sniff test" does not
implicate Fourth Amendment rights when
employed in the following settings: (i) when
conducted on luggage that has been seized at
an airport based on reasonable suspicion of
unlawful activity, where the luggage has
been separated from its owner and the "sniff
test" is conducted in a public place, (ii)
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when conducted on the exterior of a vehicle
that has been stopped in a dragnet-style stop
at a drug interdiction checkpoint, and (iii)
when conducted on the exterior of a vehicle
that has been subjected to a lawful traffic
stop. Fmiher, the United States Supreme
Court has applied a similar analysis to a
chemical "field test" for drugs when
conducted on the contents of a package that
has been damaged in transit and is being
held by a private shipping company.
We note, however, that in each of the above
cases, the United States Supreme Court was
careful to tie its ruling to the particular facts
of the case. Nothing in the above cases
indicates that the same analysis would apply
to a dog "sniff test" conducted at a private
residence.
Significantly, all the sniff and field tests in
the above cases were conducted in a
minimally intrusive manner upon objectsluggage at an airport in Place, vehicles on
the roadside in Edmond that warrant no
special protection under the Fourth
Amendment. All the tests were conducted in
an impersonal manner that subjected the
defendants to no untoward level of public
opprobrium, humiliation or embarrassment.
There was no public link between the
defendants and the luggage as it was being
tested in Place and the defendants retained a
degree of anonymity during the roadside
testing of their vehicles in Edmond. Further,
and more impOliant, under the patiicular
circumstances of each of the above cases,
the tests were not susceptible to being
employed in a discriminatory or arbitrary
manner-the luggage in Place had been
seized based on reasonable suspicion; the
vehicle in Edmond had been seized in a
dragnet-style stop. All these objects were
seized and tested in an objective and
nondiscriminatory manner, and there was no

evidence of overbearing or harassing
government conduct. There was no need for
Fourth Amendment protection. As explained
below, however, such is not the case with
respect to a dog "sniff test" conducted at a
private residence.
B. "Sniff Test" at a Private Home

As noted above, the United States Supreme
Court has held that "wherever an individual
may harbor a reasonable 'expectation of
privacy,' he is entitled to be free from
unreasonable government intrusion." Terry,
392 U.S. at 9. Nowhere is this right more
resolute than in the private home: "'At the
very core' of the Fourth Amendment 'stands
the right of a man to retreat into his own
home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion.'" Kyllo, 533 U.S. at
31.
Although police generally may initiate a
"knock and talk" encounter at the front door
of a private residence without any prior
showing of wrongdoing, a dog "sniff test" is
a qualitatively different matter. Contrary to
popular belief, a "sniff test" conducted at a
private residence is not necessarily a casual
affair in which a canine officer and dog
approach the front door and the dog then
performs a subtle "sniff test" and signals an
"alert" if drugs are detected. Quite the
contrary. In the present case, for instance, on
the morning of December 5, 2006, members
of the Miami-Dade Police Depatiment,
Narcotics Bureau, and agents of the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), United
States Depatiment of Justice, conducted a
surveillance of Jat'dines' home. As
Detectives Pedraja and Batilet and the drug
detection dog, Franky, approached the
residence, Sergeant Ramirez and Detective
Donnelly of the Miami-Dade Police
Department established perimeter positions
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around the residence and federal DEA
agents assumed stand-by positions as
backup units.
The "sniff test" conducted by the dog
handler and his dog was a vigorous and
intensive procedure.
After the "sniff test" was completed,
Detective Bartlet and Franky left the scene
to assist in another case. Detective Pedraja,
after waiting at the residence for fifteen or
twenty minutes, also left the scene to
prepare a search warrant and to submit it to
a magistrate. Federal DEA agents, however,
remained behind to maintain surveillance of
lardines' home. Pedraja obtained a search
warrant later that day and returned to the
scene. About an hour later, members of the
Miami-Dade Police Department, Narcotics
Bureau, and DEA agents executed the
warrant by gaining entry to lardines' home
through the front door. As agents entered the
front door, lardines exited through a sliding
glass door at the rear of the house. He was
apprehended by Special Agent Wilson of the
DEA and was turned over to the MiamiDade Police Department. He was charged
with trafficking in marijuana and theft of
electricity.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that
the dog "sniff test" that was conducted here
was an intrusive procedure. The "sniff test"
was a sophisticated undertaking that was the
end result of a sustained and coordinated
effort by various
law enforcement
departments. On the scene, the procedure
involved multiple police vehicles, multiple
law enforcement personnel, including
narcotics detectives and other officers, and
an experienced dog handler and trained drug
detection dog engaged in a vigorous search
effort on the front porch of the residence.
Tactical law enforcement personnel from
various government agencies, both state and

federal, were on the scene for surveillance
and backup purposes. The entire on-theactivity-i.e.,
the
scene
government
preparation for the "sniff test," the test itself,
and the aftermath, which culminated in the
full-blown search of lardines' home-lasted
for hours. The "sniff test" apparently took
place in plain view of the general public.
There was no anonymity for the resident.
Such a public spectacle unfolding in a
residential neighborhood will invariably
entail a degree of public opprobrium,
humiliation and embarrassment for the
resident, whether or not he or she is present
at the time of the search, for such dramatic
government activity in the eyes of manyneighbors, passers-by, and the public at
large-will be viewed as an official
accusation of crime. And if the resident
happens to be present at the time of the
"sniff test," such an intrusion into the
sanctity of his or her home will generally be
a frightening and harrowing experience that
could prompt a reflexive or unpredictable
response.
Further, all the underlying circumstances
that were present in the above federal "dog
sniff' and "field test" cases that guaranteed
objective, uniform application of those
tests-i.e., the temporary seizure of luggage
based on reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity in Place; the temporary seizure of a
vehicle in a dragnet-style stop at a drug
interdiction checkpoint in Edmond. Unlike
the objects in those cases, a private
residence is not susceptible to being seized
beforehand based on objective criteria.
Thus, if government agents can conduct a
dog "sniff test" at a private residence
without any prior evidentiary showing of
wrongdoing, there is simply nothing to
prevent the agents from applying the
procedure in an arbitrary or discriminatory
manner, or based on whim and fancy, at the
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home of any citizen. Such an open-ended
policy invites overbearing and harassing
conduct.
In sum, a "sniff test" by a drug detection dog
conducted at a private residence does not
only reveal the presence of contraband, as
was the case in the federal "sui generis" dog
sniff cases discussed above, but it also
constitutes an intmsive procedure that may
expose the resident to public opprobrium,
humiliation and embarrassment, and it raises
the specter of arbitrary and discriminatory
application. Given the special status
accorded a citizen's home under the Fourth
Amendment, we conclude that a "sniff test,"
such as the test that was conducted in the
present case, is a substantial government
intrusion into the sanctity of the home and
constitutes a "search" within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. As such, it warrants
the safeguards that inhere in that
amendment-specifically, the search must
be preceded by an evidentiary showing of
wrongdoing. We note that the rulings of
other state and federal courts with respect to
a dog "sniff test" conducted at a private
residence are generally mixed, as are the
rulings of other state and federal courts with
respect a dog "sniff test" conducted at an
apartment or other temporary dwelling.
IV. THE SUPPRESSION RULING
A magistrate's determination that probable
cause exists for issuance of a search warrant
is entitled to great deference when a trial
court is considering a motion to suppress.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39
(1983) And a trial comt's ruling on a motion
to suppress in such a case is subject to the
following standard of review: the reviewing
court must defer to the trial court's factual
findings if supported by competent,
substantial evidence but must review the
trial court's ultimate ruling independently,

or de novo. State v. Glatzmayer, 789 So.2d
297, 301 n. 7 (Fla.200 1).
With respect to the fact that Detective
Pedraja testified that he smelled the odor of
live marijuana plants as he stood outside the
front door of Jardines' house, the trial court
stated as follows in a footnote: "There was
evidence that after the drug detection dog
had alerted to the odor of a controlled
substance, the officer also detected a smell
of marijuana plants emanating from the front
door. However, this information was only
confirming what the detection dog had
already revealed."
A warrantless "sniff test" by a dmg
detection dog conducted at the front door of
a private residence is impermissible under
the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the trial court
properly excluded the results of the "sniff
test" from its review of the magistrate's
probable
cause
determination.
The
remammg evidence consisted of the
following: the unverified "crime stoppers"
tip, the closed window blinds, and the
constantly running air conditioner. As for
Detective Pedraja's statement that he
detected the odor of live marijuana plants as
he stood outside the front door, we note that
the trial court had the opportunity to observe
Detective Pedraja's testimony first-hand at
the suppression hearing. Fmther, the district
court in Rabb addressed an identical
situation and concluded as follows:
[B]ecause the chronology of the
probable cause affidavit suggests that
the dog alert to marijuana occurred
prior to law enforcement's detection
of its odor, we cannot assume that
law enforcement detected the odor of
marijuana before the dog alerted ....
As such, this is not a case in which a
law enforcement officer used his
senses to detect something within his
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plain
smell;
rather,
a
law
enforcement officer used enhanced,
animal senses to detect something
inside a home that he might not
otherwise have detected.
Rabb, 920 So.2d at 1191. Based on our
review of the present record, we conclude
that the trial court's factual findings are
supported
by
competent,
substantial
evidence and the trial court's ultimate ruling
is supported in the law. The district court
erred in reversing the suppression ruling.

V. CONCLUSION
"We have said that the Fourth Amendment
draws 'a firm line at the entrance to the
house.' That line, we think, must be not only
firm but also bright-which requires clear
of those
methods
of
specification
surveillance that require a wanant." Kyllo,
533 U.S. at 40. Given the special status
accorded a citizen's home in AngloAmerican jurisprudence, we hold that the
wanantless "sniff test" that was conducted
at the front door of the residence in the
present case was
an
unreasonable
government intrusion into the sanctity of the
home and violated the Fourth Amendment.
We quash the decision in lardines and
approve the result in Rabb.
It is so ordered.

POLSTON, J., dissenting.
Because the majority's decision violates
binding United States Supreme Court
precedent, I respectfully dissent.
Despite the majority's focus upon multiple
officers and the supposed time involved in
surveillance and in execution of the search
warrant, it is undisputed that one dog and

two officers were lawfully and briefly
present near the front door of lardines'
residence when the dog sniff at issue in this
case took place. And despite statements
about privacy interests in items and odors
within and escaping from a home, the
United States Supreme Court has ruled that
there are no legitimate privacy interests III
contraband under the Fourth Amendment.
Contrary to the majority's position, the
United States Supreme COUli has ruled that
a dog sniff is not a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment because
a dog sniff only reveals contraband in which
there is no legitimate privacy interest.
Accordingly, the dog sniff involved in this
case, which occurred while law enforcement
was lawfully present at the front door,
cannot be considered a search in violation of
the Fourth Amendment.

I. ANALYSIS
The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that "[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated."
The similar right contained in the Florida
Constitution is "construed in confonnity
with the 4th Amendment to the United
States Constitution, as interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court." Art. I, § 12,
Fla. Const. Therefore, this Court's
jurisprudence in this area must conform to
the United States Supreme Court's
precedent
interpreting
the
Fourth
Amendment.
In this case, it is undisputed that law
enforcement was lawfully present at
lardines' front door. While the Fourth
Amendment certainly protects "the right of a
man to retreat into his own home and there
be free from unreasonable governmental
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intrusion," Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505, 511 (1961), the publicly accessible
area around the front door of the home is not
accorded the same degree of Fourth
Amendment protection. In fact, the majority
acknow ledges that "one does not harbor an
expectation of privacy on a front porch
where salesmen or visitors may appear at
any time." Majority op. at 46.
Furthermore, there are no allegations here
that an officer's detection of the scent of
marijuana while lawfully present at
Jardines' front door would have violated the
Fourth Amendment. There are no such
allegations because "the police may see
what may be seen 'from a public vantage
point where [they have] a right to be. '"
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989).
Or, as the Ninth Circuit plainly put it with
regard to the sense of smell, one does not
have "a reasonable expectation of privacy
from drug agents with inquisitive nostrils."
United States v. Johnston, 497 F.2d 397, 398
(9th Cir.1974).
Accordingly, the only remaining question at
issue in this case is whether a law
enforcement officer, who is lawfully present
at the front door of a private residence, may
employ a dog sniff at that front door. Based
upon binding United States Supreme Court
precedent, the answer is quite clearly yes.
The United States Supreme Court has
explained that "a Fourth Amendment search
does not occur-even when the explicitly
protected location of a hOllse is concernedunless 'the individual manifested a
subjective expectation of privacy in the
object of the challenged search,' and
'society [is] willing to recognize that
expectation as reasonable. '" Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
Additionally, and of great importance here,

the United States Supreme Court has held
that a dog sniff does not constitute a search
within the meanmg of the Fourth
Amendment because it only reveals
contraband and there is no legitimate
privacy interest in contraband that society is
willing to recognize as reasonable.
First, in Place, 462 U.S. at 707, the United
States Supreme Court stated the following
regarding the unique and very limited nature
of a dog sniff when holding that a dog sniff
of a passenger's luggage in an airport was
not a search under the Fourth Amendment:
We have affirmed that a person
possesses a privacy interest in the
contents of personal luggage that is
protected by the Fourth Amendment.
A "canine sniff' by a well-trained
narcotics detection dog, however,
does not require opening the
luggage. It does not expose
noncontraband items that otherwise
would remain hidden from public
view, as does, for example, an
officer's rummaging through the
contents of the luggage. Thus, the
manner in which information is
obtained through this investigative
technique is much less intrusive than
a typical search. Moreover, the sniff
discloses only the presence or
absence of narcotics, a contraband
item. Thus, despite the fact that the
sniff tells the authorities something
about the contents of the luggage, the
information obtained is limited. This
limited disclosure also ensures that
the owner of the property is not
subjected to the embarrassment and
inconvenience entailed m less
discriminate and more intrusive
investigative methods.
In these respects, the canine sniff
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generis. We are aware of no other
investigative procedure that is so limited
both in the manner in which the information
is obtained and in the content of the
information revealed by the procedure.
Therefore, we conclude that the particular
course of investigation that the agents
intended to pursue here--exposure of
respondent's luggage, which was located in
a public place, to a trained canine-did not
constitute a "search" within the meaning of
the FOUlih Amendment.

Then, the United States Supreme Court
further explained its decision in Place when
holding in Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123, that a
chemical test of a package did not constitute
a search because "governmental conduct
that can reveal whether a substance is
cocaine, and no other arguably 'private' fact,
compromises no legitimate privacy interest."
The Court stated that this holding was
"dictated" by Place because, "as in Place,
the likelihood that official conduct of the
kind disclosed by the record will actually
compromise any legitimate interest in
privacy seems much too remote to
characterize the testing as a search subject to
the Fourth Amendment." Jacobsen, 466
U.S. at 124. The COUli explained that "the
reaSon [the dog sniff in Place] did not
intrude upon any legitimate privacy interest
was that the governmental conduct could
reveal nothing about noncontraband items."
Thereafter, in Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40, the
United States Supreme Court reaffirmed
Place when briefly discussing why a dog
sniff of the exterior of a car stopped at a
checkpoint did not constitute a search:

It is well established that a vehicle
stop at a highway checkpoint
effectuates a seizure within the
meaning of the FOUlih Amendment.
The fact that officers walk a

narcotics-detection dog around the
exterior of each car at the
Indianapolis checkpoints does not
transform the seizure into a search.
Just as in Place, an exterior sniff of
an automobile does not require entry
into the car and is not designed to
disclose any information other than
the presence or absence of narcotics.
Like the dog sniff in Place, a sniff by
a dog that simply walles around a car
is "much less intrusive than a typical
search."
To summarize, in Place, Jacobsen, Edmond,
the United States Supreme Court held that
dog sniffs are not searches within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment because
they only detect contraband and there is no
legitimate privacy interest in contraband that
society recognizes as reasonable. A vast
majority of federal and state courts have
interpreted the United States Supreme
Court's decisions as holding that dog sniffs
are not searches under the FOUlih
Amendment, even in the context of private
residences.
In this case, Franky the dog was lawfully
present at Jardines' front door when he
alerted to the presence of marijuana. And
because, under the binding United States
Supreme Court precedent described above, a
dog sniff only reveals contraband in which
there is no legitimate privacy interest,
Franky's sniff cannot be considered a search
violating the Fourth Amendment.
The majority concludes that the United
States Supreme Court's precedent regarding
dog sniffs does not apply here because those
dog sniff cases did not involve dog sniffs of
a home. See majority op. at 44. However,
the United States Supreme Court did not
limit its reasoning regarding dogs sniffs to
locations or objects unrelated to the home.
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There is no language in Place, Jacobsen, or
Edmond that indicates the reasoning that dog
sniffs are not searches would change if the
cases involved private residences. Therefore,
the very limited and unique type of intrusion
involved in a dog sniff is the dispositive
distinction under United States Supreme
Court precedent, not whether the object
sniffed is luggage, an automobile, or a
home. Accordingly, the majority's holding
based upon the object sniffed is contrary to
the United States Supreme Comi's
precedent.
In addition, the majority distinguishes the
binding precedent regarding dog sniffs
based upon what it terms "public
opprobrium,
humiliation
and
embarrassment." Majority op. at 36, 45, 48,
49-50. By focusing upon the multiple
officers and the supposed time involved in
surveillance and the execution of the search
warrant, the majority concludes that the sniff
here was more intensive and involved a
higher level of embarrassment than the
sniffs involved in Place and Edmond. See
majority op. at 46--47, 48--49. However,
Place and Edmond all involved law
enforcement activity by multiple officers.
And although the majority states that the law
enforcement activity in this case "lasted for
hours," majority op. at 36, 48, there is no
evidence in the record to suppOli that
supposition. To the contrary, when asked
during the suppression hearing how long he
and the dog "remain[ed] on the scene that
day," Detective Bartlet responded, "That
was a day we were doing multiple
operations and I had probably two other
people waiting for the dog. So I couldn't
have been there much more than five or ten
minutes, just enough to grab the information
on the flash drive, hand it over and leave."
The other specific testimony regarding time
in the record is Detective Pedraja's
testimony during the suppression hearing

explaining that he conducted surveillance
for fifteen minutes before approaching the
residence with Detective Bartlet and the dog
and that it was "approximately 15 to 20
minutes from the time that [he] went to the
front door, was standing at the threshold,
went to the front door and then came back."
Fmihermore, as explained above, there are
no allegations here that the multiple officers
near lardines' residence violated the Fourth
Amendment, regardless of the level of
"public opprobrium, humiliation, and
embarrassment" that the presence of these
officers may have caused lardines.
Therefore, distinguishing this case from the
United States Supreme Comi's dog sniff
cases based upon the level of embarrassment
the majority presumes to be present here is
improper.
Finally, it is critical to note that the
majority's (and the special concurrence's)
assumption that lardines had a reasonable
expectation that the smell of marijuana
coming from his residence would remain
private IS contrary to the explicit
pronouncements in Jacobsen that the
possessor of contraband has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in that contraband.
Indeed, the fact that one has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in contraband is
precisely why a dog sniff is not a search
under the United States Supreme Comi's
precedent
interpreting
the
Fourth
Amendment. Because the dog sniff is only
capable of detecting contraband, it is only
capable of detecting that which is not
protected by the Fourth Amendment.
III. CONCLUSION

As held by United States Supreme Court, a
dog sniff is not a search within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment because it only
reveals contraband and there is no legitimate
expectation of privacy in contraband that
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society is willing to recognize as reasonable.
Given this binding precedent, Franky's sniff,
while lawfully present at Jardines' front
door, cannot be considered a search under
the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, I would

approve the Third District's decision in
lardines and disapprove the Fourth
District's contrary decision in Rabb.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
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"Does the War on Drugs Affect
Your Privacy Rights?"
HlIffington Post
May 22,2012
Jane Yakowitz Bambauer
Do the police need a warrant to bring a
drug-sniffing dog to your front door? The
U.S. Supreme Court will soon answer that
question. The case, Florida v. Jardines, may
even prompt the Court to reconsider its
previous Fourth Amendment dog sniff cases,
United States v. Place and I1linois v.
Caballes. These two decisions had held that
police don't need a warrant for a dog to sniff
your luggage in an airport, or your car by the
side of the road, finding that the sniffs are
"searches"
under
the
Fourth
not
Amendment. The logic is straightforward:
since a sniff "discloses only the presence or
absence of narcotics, a contraband item," a
search after a dog's alert cannot offend
reasonable expectations of privacy. Of
course, the logical flaw is equally obvious:
police dogs often alert when drugs are not
III
unnecessary
present,
resulting
suspicionless searches.
But do these cases track our intuitions about
privacy? I recently conducted qualitative
research based on the facts of Florida v.
Jardines. The complete results appear in a
new Stanford Law Review Online essay. I
asked 187 law students whether contrabanddetecting dog sniffs should be considered an
invasion of privacy under a variety of false
alert rates. Not surprisingly, the dogs'
accuracy rates mattered significantly. Fewer
than half believed that a perfectly accurate
dog's sniff of a car constituted an invasion
of privacy that should require a warrant or
some reasonable suspicion. By comparison,
two-thirds believed the sniff by the dog with
a 10 percent false alert error rate needed a

warrant.
But accuracy was not the only important
factor; in fact, it wasn't even the most
important factor. Unbeknownst to the
students, the surveys randomly varied the
type of contraband the dogs were trained to
detect. Roughly one-third of the students
responded to a hypothetical scenario
involving a drug-sniffing dog, one-third
responded to a bomb-sniffing dog, and onethird responded to a human cadaver-sniffing
dog. Students' instincts about privacy were
very sensitive to the type of criminal
investigation. Those assigned to react to the
drug-sniffing dog were much less tolerant of
police practices. Fifty-six percent of
respondents believed even the mythical
perfectly accurate drug sniff constituted a
FOUlih Amendment search, while the
corresponding rates for cadavers and bombs
were 30 percent and 36 percent,
respectively. The results probably reflect a
shared skepticism about the efficacy and
legitimacy of the "war on drugs." If the
police use a dog to see if you're smoking
marijuana at home, students think they
should get a warrant -- but not if they're
checking for dead bodies, or pipe bombs.
At present, courts do not consider the type
of criminal investigation when deciding
whether police conduct constitutes a search,
and as a practical matter the distinction is
futile. The contraband-sniffing dog is just a
first-generation information-gathering tool.
In time, a single instrument (possibly a
drone) will detect drugs and bombs. Ifpolice
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conduct is sufficiently intrusive, it should
not evade designation as a search simply
because it is employed to achieve more
wOlihwhile criminal enforcement goals.
Conversely,
unobtrusive
investigatory
practices should not be dismissed too
quickly. Our implicit reaction to drug
enforcement policies may prompt us to
welcome a reversal of the previous dog sniff
cases, but we may be overlooking the value
of
contraband-detecting
technologies.
Traditional suspicion-based policing is
dependent on the discretion of police
officers, which is prone to error and bias.
Suspicionless screens, if they are used
properly, redistribute the burdens of criminal
investigation
and
punishment
more
equitably across the population. Our crime
control policies are more likely to be
carefully designed when they will apply to
all of us. Police techniques that detect
contraband can simultaneously improve
crime detection and reduce law enforcement

discretion (and, hence, potential abuse).
The Supreme Court should use the Jardines
case to reconfigure Fourth Amendment
analysis to accommodate both the old model
of individualized suspicion and new models
designed to decrease discretion. To be
legitimate, these "suspicionless nonsearches" should meet three criteria. The
tool must have low error, be applied
uniformly, and have negligible interference
(that is, the tool itself should not cause
adverse effects.) The dog sniff in Jm-dines
fails all three of these elements, and there is
little reason to believe dogs will ever
produce a sufficiently low rate of error. But
other processes and technologies have the
potential to be what dogs never wereaccurate and fair. With luck, the Court will
recognize a Fourth Amendment search in
Jardines without creating a rule that
reflexively obstructs the use of new
technologies.
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"Florida Says Drug-Sniffing Dogs in Front of Private
Homes Do Not Invade Privacy"
Gant Daily
December 30, 2011
Torn Ramstacl(
The Supreme Court is being asked to decide
whether a drug-sniffing dog that detects
marijuana through the door of a house IS
violating the privacy of the homeowner.
Miami police say a dog sniffing the air
outside a house doesn't trample anyone's
privacy. It's a matter of discretion for police.
The homeowner, 10elis 1ardines, said the
sniffing was a "search" that first requires
probable cause to believe a crime has been
committed on the site. Otherwise, the police
violate the homeowner's Fourth Amendment
rights of privacy.
Jardines was charged with felony marijuana
offenses but appealed.
The Fourth Amendment says that "[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause."
The case began Nov. 3, 2006, when MiamiDade police received a Crime Stoppers tip
that 1ardines' horne was being used to grow
manJuana.
Police went to the house on Dec. 6, 2006,
with a drug detection dog named Franky.
They observed the house for 15 minutes but
saw no activity inside. They then stepped
onto the porch with the dog and stopped at
the front door.

The dog handler said Franky indicated a
"positive alert" for the odor of drugs.
A detective noticed the air conditioning unit
was running without stopping, which he said
often happens in houses where marijuana is
grown hydroponically under high intensity
lights that create heat.
The detective then applied for a search
warrant, which a local judge granted. Police
raided the horne and found marijuana. They
arrested 1m'dines as he fled.
Jardines's defense relied on a ruling in a
2004 federal case in which a judge said a
police dog's sniffing near a house was the
same as searching the horne.
For private homes, "a firm line remains at its
entrance blocking the noses of dogs from
sniffing government's way into the intimate
details of an individual's life," the federal
court ruling said.
A trial comi agreed and threw out the
evidence against 1ardines.
Prosecutors appealed to Florida's 3rd
District Court of Appeal in Miami, which
reinstated the case against 1ardines.
No warrant is needed for a dog to sniff
around a house, the state appeals court said.
The court's ruling against 1m'dines relied on
a 2005 U.S. Supreme Court decision that
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said police dogs are trained to search only
for illegal items, such as drugs. No one has a
privacy right in illegal drugs, which means a
dog sniff could not violate anyone's Fourth
Amendment rights.

Without using the dogs, the state might not
be able to get the evidence needed for a
search warrant, thereby impairing the ability
of police to enforce drug laws, the petition
says.

Unlike wiretaps and surveillance cameras
that capture all conversations and images on
a telephone or a place being monitored, dogs
target their sniffs only at illegal items, the
Supreme Court said.

In addition, dogs are low-tech aids to police
that do not represent the same degree of
intrusion
as
sophisticated
electronic
eavesdropping.

However, the Florida Supreme Court sided
with the homeowner, saying a dog sniff of a
house without a warrant is "an unreasonable
government intrusion into the sanctity of the
home."
In the state's appeal to the Supreme Court,
Attorney General Pam Bondi's petition says
"Florida courts are now alone in refusing to
follow" rules of law that would allow drugsniffing dogs to be used without warrants
outside private homes.

"Chocolate Labrador retrievers are not
systems,"
the
attorney
sophisticated
general's petition to the Supreme Court
says. "Rather, they are common household
pets that possess a naturally strong sense of
smell; Nor was there a 'vigorous search
effort' at the front door; all Franky really did
was breathe."
The Supreme COUli could decide as soon as
next week whether to hear the case of
Florida.
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"Florida High Court Rules on
Drug Dog Sniff Tests"
The Ledger
April 14,2011
The Florida Supreme Court has ruled that
police must get a warrant before they can do
a "sniff test" by a drug-detection dog at the
front door of a home.
The court released its 5-2 opinion Thursday.
Police went to a Miami-Dade home in 2006
with a drug-sniffing dog on a tip, later
arresting the resident and seizing marijuana.
The court's majority said police should have
gotten a warrant first because a drug dog's
sniffing outside at a private residence

constitutes a search.
But dissenters said there's no expectation of
privacy regarding illegal substances in one's
home.
Attorney General Pam Bondi says the ruling
hinders law enforcement and plans to appeal
it to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The case is SC08-21 0 1, Joelis Jardines v.
State of Florida.

368

"The Dog-Sniffing Cases: Made Simple"
SCOTUSblog
July 26, 2012
Lyle Denniston
Police forces across the country have found
that dogs, which have a highly developed
sense of smell, can be trained to detect
specific odors, such as scents from a human
body, or the odors given off by illegal drugs.
This makes police dogs highly valued
partners to police as they search for missing
persons, or for illegal narcotics. When a
trained dog's capacity to detect a certain
odor has been formally certified by an
expert, the evidence that police gain from
dog searches frequently is permitted in
criminal cases in comt. But the Supreme
Court several times has had to rule on
whether a search by a trained police dog is
the kind of inspection that must be done
so that it does not violate the constitutional
right to privacy of the individual targeted.
The Court will give further constitutional
guidance in two new cases, both originating
in Florida.
The Fourth Amendment is one of the
Constitution's strongest guarantees of
personal privacy, especially for the privacy
of the home. The Supreme Court has made
clear that the protection given by
the Amendment is intended to protect
people, rather than physical space. But its
protection does extend beyond the
individual's own body, to places and things
which the owner and society in general
would recognize as intended to be free from
government intrusion. Thus, the protection
can apply to houses, documents, and
personal belongings. Searches by police or
other government agents, however, are
generally barred only if they are
"unreasonable." That is a sufficiently
flexible word that courts have traditionally

had to fill in meaning on how to apply it in
specific situations. The Amendment also
provides that, as a general rule, police
cannot carry out a search unless they have
the permission of a judge, through a
"warrant." Police can obtain a warrant to
carry out a search only if they have a fairly
strong reason to believe that the search will
turn up evidence of crime. Police do not
have to be absolutely celtain that the search
will lead to evidence, but rather that
prospect must be "probable." In some
situations, a warrant is not needed, but
police still need to show that a search
"probably" will turn up criminal evidence.
But, before FOUlth Amendment protection
comes into play, police activity must
actually be found to be a "search" in a legal
sense. For example, if one puts the family
trash out on the curb, police can inspect it
without getting a warrant because the family
has given up any expectation that the
contents of the trash bags are private. But, if
the trash is still in the can inside the house,
perhaps in the kitchen, police could search it
only if they got a warrant allowing them to
do so; that would be a search in a place that
the homeowner considers to be private, and
so does society in general. For another
example, if one keeps drugs in the glove
compartment of a car or truck, and police
pull over that vehicle for a traffic violation,
police are not allowed to search the glove
compartment unless they have some reason
to think that the search will turn up evidence
related to the reason the vehicle was
stopped. But if the individual, on getting out
of the vehicle, drops a package of drugs on
the ground, police can gather that up and use
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it as evidence, because they were not
searching for it when it just turned up.

It is clear, then, that the factual situation can
make a difference constitutionally. And that
is why the Supreme Court has had to return
periodically to define the situations in which
the police may use a drug-sniffing dog,
without violating someone's right to privacy
under the Fourth Amendment. That issue
arises, of course, because a well-trained
drug-sniffing dog, by giving an "alert" to its
police handler when the animal smells a
specific drug, may actually lead the police to
the discovery of evidence of a crime. If the
Fourth Amendment does not apply at all,
police may hand over that evidence to a
prosecutor who pursues criminal charges.
But if the Fourth Amendment might apply,
the evidence might be valid or it might not
be, depending upon the factual situation.
Police and prosecutors have generally
argued in court cases that the use of a drugsniffing dog is not a "search" at all, because
the only thing that a dog's "aleti" identifies
is something that is illegal anyway, and no
one has any privacy right in illegal items or
substances. The Supreme Court has
sometimes embraced that argument.
For example, the COUli has ruled that it is
not a "search" under the FOUlih Amendment
if police use a dog to sniff the exterior of
luggage that police have temporarily seized
in an airport terminal, believing that it is
likely to contain something illegal. It also
has allowed police to check the outside of a
vehicle that police have legitimately stopped
at a highway checkpoint set up to search for
illegal drugs, or to check the outside of a
vehicle that police have legally stopped for a
suspected traffic violation. In each of those
situations, the impact on privacy was
considered to be very slight, because the
intrusion was minimal, so the use of the dog
did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Suppose, though, that police use a dog to
check for narcotics on the exterior of a home
that they suspect is being used for drug
trafficking. Does the fact that the site of the
search is a private home make a
constitutional difference? That is one of the
new factual situations that the Supreme
Court is now preparing to confront. In the
case of Florida v. Jardines, Florida's state
supreme court ruled that the U.S. Supreme
Comi's past rulings on the use of drugsniffing dogs did not apply at all when a dog
was used at a home, even if the dog only
sniffed exterior surfaces of a house.
Nowhere is the right of privacy stronger
than in a private home, the state court said.
That case originated when police in Miami
got a tip from a "crime stopper" source that
the home of 10elis lardines was being used
to grow marijuana. Police went to the home,
based on that tip alone, and used a trained
detection dog named Franky to check out
the front porch of the house. After circling
for a few minutes, Franky sat down, near the
front door. That indicated to his police
handler that the dog had detected an odor of
marijuana coming from under the front door.
At that point, the officers obtained a search
warrant, which the officers then carried out,
finding a marijuana-growing operation
inside the house. lardines was charged with
growing illegal marijuana plants, but his
lawyer contended that the search was
unconstitutional because it intruded on the
privacy of the home.
The state's highest court relied primarily
upon a 2001 Supreme Court decision, in the
case of Kyllo v. United States, a ruling that it
is unconstitutional for police to use a heatsensing device aimed at the outside walls of
a house, to check to see if marijuana was
being grown inside with the use of highintensity lamps. When the government uses
a device that the general public does not
employ, and the police use it to explore the
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details of a home, the state court said, that is
a "search" under the Fourth Amendment. A
trained dog's sniff test fits into that category,
it concluded, adding that such a test reveals
not only the presence of something illegal,
but it also is capable-when carried out in
public view-of exposing the homeowner to
public humiliation and embarrassment, and
further is capable of being used in a
discriminatory way. Before police may
conduct such a sniff test, it ruled, they must
be able to show in court-after the factthat they had more than mere suspicion that
a crime was being committed in the crime;
they had to have information indicating that
it was "probable" that there was such
criminal wrongdoing taking place in the
home. The bottom line of the ruling: the use
of Franky at the Jardines home was
"unreasonable," so the marijuana evidence
could not be used against him.
That ruling is being challenged by state
officials of Florida in their appeal to the
Supreme Court. They have the support of
the federal government for their challenge.
Their basic claim is that a sniff test by a
drug is not a search at all, at a home or
elsewhere.
In the other Florida case that the Justices
will be reviewing (Florida v. Harris), state
officials have persuaded the Court to return
to the issue of a dog sniff test on a car or
truck, not a home. But this time, the sniff
test was done on the inside of a private
truck. The Florida Supreme Court, finding
that the U.S. Supreme Court's prior rulings
involving sniff tests and vehicles only
involved checking the exterior of a vehicle,
decided that the Fourth Amendment
provided greater protection when the dog's
"aleli" led police to search the interior of a
vehicle. But the decision also is important
because the state court spelled out the
information that police must have in order to
convince a court that a drug-sniffing dog can

be trusted to make a reliable "alert"
indicating that illegal drugs were present.
A Liberty County sheriffs deputy with a
drug-detecting dog named Aldo, who had
been trained to detect the illegal drug
methamphetamine, was on patrol in
Blountstown, Florida. The deputy pulled
over a truck driven by Clayton Harris
because the license plate on the vehicle had
expired. The officer noticed that Harris was
shaking badly, and was breathing rapidlytelltale signs, for the officer, that Harris
might be on drugs. The officer asked for
permission to search the truck, but Harris
refused. The dog then "alelied" to a drug on
the door handle of the driver's side of the
truck. With that "alert" as legal justification,
the officer searched the interior of the
truck's cab, and found ingredients for
making methamphetamine.
Harris was charged with possessing
materials for making the illegal drug, and his
defense lawyer challenged the use of the
evidence found in the truck's cab, arguing
that the search of the truck's interior
violated the FOUlih Amendment because the
deputy had no legal basis for conducting
such a search. The Florida Supreme COUli
agreed, concluding that Aldo's "alert" to a
substance on the truck door handle was not
sufficient to justify searching the cab. A
police dog's "alert," the state cOUli said, is
not enough by itself to satisfy a court that
the dog is properly trained and certified for
the detection of a specific illegal drug. A
court can accept an "alert" as a basis for a
search only if the evidence shows how the
particular dog was trained, what was done to
satisfy an expert that the dog was adequately
trained, how the dog had actually performed
in "alerting" to drugs in other situations, and
how well trained and how experienced was
the dog's police handler.
The state court remarked that it appeared
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that, in dog-sniffing drug cases, "the courts
often accept the mythic dog with an almost
superstitious faith. The myth so completely
has dominated the judicial psyche in these
cases that the courts either assume the
reliability of the sniff or address the question
cursorily; the dog is the clear and consistent
winner."
Finding in the Harris case that there was not
enough proof that Aldo was a reliable drug
detector, the state court overturned Clayton

Harris's no-contest plea to the criminal
charge, because the evidence taken out of
the truck cab should not have been allowed
in court.
State officials, with the support of the
federal government, have asked the Supreme
Court to rule that the fact that a trained and
certified dog does make an "alert" should be
enough to justify a police officer's further
search of a vehicle for illegal drugs.
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Florida v. Harris
11-817
Ruling Below: Harris v. State, 71 So. 3d 756 (Fla. 2011), as revised on denial ofreh'g (Sept. 22,
2011), cert. granted, 2012 WL 986836 (U.S. 2012).

During a traffic stop in 2006, Clayton Harris's truck was searched by the Liberty County Sheriff
after police dog Aldo alerted the police to drugs in HalTis's vehicle. The police found
pseudoephedrine pills, matches, and muriatic acid, all materials used to make methamphetamine
("meth"). Two months later, Harris was stopped for another traffic infraction and was searched
after another alert by Aldo, but no illegal drugs were found during this second search. Harris was
charged with possession of pseudoephedrine with intent to use it to manufacture
methamphetamine, violating Florida Statutes § 893.149(1)(a) (2006). Harris moved to suppress
the seized evidence, including the pseudoephedrine, arguing that it was found pursuant to an
illegal search of his truck. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that there was
probable cause to search Harris's truck, and admitted the physical evidence seized. Harris then
entered a plea of no contest, reserving the right to appeal the denial of the motion, and was
sentenced to two years in jail and five years of probation. The First District affirmed, again
finding probable cause for the searches. The Supreme Court of Florida held that the trial court
should have granted Harris's motion to suppress and remanded the case. The Supreme COUli of
Florida applied a totality of the circumstances approach, requiring the State present evidence and
explanation of training and celiification, field performance records, and evidence concerning the
experience and training of the officer handling the dog.
Question Presented: Whether an aleli by a well-trained narcotics detection dog certified to
detect illegal contraband is insufficient to establish probable cause for the search of a vehicle.

Clayton HARRIS, Petitioner,

v.
ST ATE of Florida, Respondent

Supreme Court of Florida
Decided April 21, 2011; Revised on Denial of Rehearing September 22,2011
[Excerpt; some text, footnotes, and citations omitted.]
PARIENTE, Judge

When will a drug-detection dog's alert to the
exterior of a vehicle provide an officer with
probable cause to conduct a warrantless
search of the interior of the vehicle? That is
the question in this case, and the answer is

integral to the constitutional right of all
individuals in this state to be protected from
unreasonable searches and seizures.
The issue of when a dog's aleli provides
probable cause for a search hinges on the
dog's reliability as a detector of illegal
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substances within the vehicle. We hold that
the State may establish probable cause by
demonstrating that the officer had a
reasonable basis for believing the dog to be
reliable based on the totality of the
circumstances. Because a dog cannot be
cross-examined like a police officer on the
scene whose observations often provide the
basis for probable cause to search a vehicle,
the
State must introduce evidence
concerning the dog's reliability. In this case,
we specifically address the question of what
evidence the State must introduce in order to
establish the reasonableness of the officer's
belief-in other words, what evidence must
be introduced in order for the trial court to
adequately
undertake
an
objective
evaluation of the officer's belief in the dog's
reliability as a predicate for determining
probable cause.
The appellate courts addressing the issue in
this state have differed on what evidence the
State must present to meet its burden. The
decision of the First District Court of Appeal
in Harris v. State, 989 So.2d 1214 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2008), expressly and directly conflicts
with the decisions of the Second District
Court of Appeal in Gibson v. State, 968
So.2d 631 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), and
Matheson v. State, 870 So.2d 8 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2003). In Harris, the First District
without elaboration cited State v. Laveroni
910 So.2d 333 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), and
State v. Coleman, 911 So.2d 259 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2005), as authority in suppOli of
affirming the trial court, which upheld the
search at issue. The First District also cited
Gibson, which followed Matheson, as
contradictory authority.
The reliability of a dog as a detector of
illegal substances is subject to a totality of
the circumstances analysis. Thus, the trial
court must be presented with the evidence

necessary
to
make
an
adequate
determination as to the dog's reliability. For
the reasons explained below, we hold that
evidence that the dog has been trained and
celiified to detect narcotics, standing alone,
is not sufficient to establish the dog's
reliability for purposes of determining
probable cause-especially since training
and celiification in this state are not
standardized and thus each training and
certification program may differ with no
meaningful way to assess them.
Accordingly, we conclude that to meet its
burden of establishing that the officer had a
reasonable basis for believing the dog to be
reliable in order to establish probable cause,
the State must present the training and
certification records, an explanation of the
meaning of the particular training and
celiification of that dog, field performance
records, and evidence concerning the
experience and training of the officer
handling the dog, as well as any other
objective evidence known to the officer
about the dog's reliability in being able to
detect the presence of illegal substances
within the vehicle. To adopt the contrary
view that the burden is on the defendant to
present evidence of the factors other than
certification and training in order to
demonstrate that the dog is unreliable would
be contrary to the well-established
proposition that the burden is on the State to
establish probable cause for a warrantless
search. In addition, since all of the records
and evidence are in the possession of the
State, to shift the burden to the defendant to
produce evidence of the dog's unreliability
is unwarranted and unduly burdensome.
Accordingly, we quash Harris and
disapprove Coleman and Laveroni. We
approve Gibson and Matheson to the extent
they are consistent with this opinion.
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FACTS
In July 2006, the State charged Clayton
Harris with possession of the listed chemical
pseudoephedrine with intent to use it to
manufacture
methamphetamine,
more
commonly known as meth, in violation of
section 893.149(l)(a), Florida Statutes
(2006). Harris subsequently moved to
suppress seized evidence, including the
pseudoephedrine, arguing that it was found
pursuant to an illegal search of his truck.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the
evidence established that on June 24, 2006,
Liberty County Sheriffs Canine Officer
William Wheetley and his drug-detection
dog, Aldo, were on patrol. Officer Wheetley
conducted a traffic stop of Harris's truck
after confirming that Harris's tag was
expired. Upon approaching the truck,
Officer Wheetley noticed that Harris was
shaking, breathing rapidly, and could not sit
still. Officer Wheetley also noticed an open
beer can in the cup holder. When Officer
Wheetley asked for consent to search the
truck, Harris refused. Officer Wheetley then
deployed Aldo. Upon conducting a "free air
sniff' of the exterior of the truck, Aldo
alerted to the door handle of the driver's
side.
Underneath the driver's seat, Officer
200
Wheetley
discovered
over
pseudoephedrine pills in a plastic bag
wrapped in a shirt. On the passenger's side,
Officer Wheetley discovered eight boxes of
matches containing a total of 8000 matches.
Officer Wheetley then placed Harris under
arrest. A subsequent search of a toolbox on
the passenger side revealed muriatic acid.
Officer Wheetley testified that these
of
chemicals
are
precursors
methamphetamine. After being read his
Miranda rights, Harris stated that he had
been cooking meth for about one year and

most recently cooked it at his home in
Blountstown two weeks prior to the stop.
Harris also admitted to being addicted to
meth and needing it at least every few days.
As of the day that Officer Wheetley
searched Harris's truck, Officer Wheetley
had been a law enforcement officer for three
years and had been a canine handler since
2004. In January 2004, Aldo completed a
120-hour drug detection training course at
the Apopka Police Department with his
handler at the time, Deputy Sherriff William
Morris. In February 2004, Aldo was
certified with Morris as a drug-detection dog
by Drug Beat K-9 Certifications. Aldo is
trained and certified to detect cannabis,
cocaine,
ecstasy,
heroin,
and
methamphetamine. Aldo is not trained to
detect alcohol or pseudoephedrine. Although
Officer
Wheetley
testified
that
pseudoephedrine is a precursor of meth,
there was no testimony on whether a dog
trained to detect and alert to meth would
also detect and aleli to pseudoephedrine.
In July 2005, Aldo and Officer Wheetley
became partners. In February 2006, they
completed a forty-hour training seminar
with the Dothan Police Department. Officer
Wheetley testified that he and Aldo
complete
this
seminar
annually.
Additionally, Officer Wheetley trains Aldo
four hours per week in detecting drugs in
vehicles, buildings, and warehouses. For
example, Officer Wheetley may take Aldo
to a wrecker yard and plant drugs in six to
eight out of ten vehicles. Officer Wheetley
then takes Aldo and performs a "W pattern,
up, down, up, down."
Aldo must alert to the vehicles with drugs,
and he is rewarded for an accurate aleli.
Officer Wheetley described Aldo's success
rate during training as "really good." Aldo's
training records, which Officer Wheetley
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began keeping in November 2005, were
introduced in evidence. These records reveal
that on a performance level of either
satisfactory
or
unsatisfactory,
Aldo
performed satisfactory 100% of the time.
However, Officer Wheetley did not explain
whether a satisfactory performance includes
any alerts to vehicles where drugs were not
placed.
Officer Wheetley also testified that in
Florida a single-purpose dog, such as one
trained only to detect drugs, is not required
by law to carry celiification. These dogs are
required to show proficiency only in
locating drugs. By contrast, a dual-purpose
dog, such as one trained in apprehension and
drug detection, must carry Florida
Depmiment of Law Enforcement (FDLE)
certification. Florida does not have a set
standard for certification for single-purpose
drug dogs, such as Aldo.
With regard to Aldo's performance in the
field, Officer Wheetley testified that he
deploys Aldo approximately five times per
month. Officer Wheetley maintains records
of Aldo's field performance only when
Officer Wheetley makes an arrest. Officer
Wheetley testified that he does not keep
records of Aldo's alerts in the field when no
contraband is found; he documents only
Aldo's successes. These records were
neither produced prior to the hearing nor
introduced at the hearing. Thus, it is
impossible to determine what percentage of
time Aldo alerted and no contraband was
found following a warrantless search of the
vehicle.
Harris introduced evidence of a specific
instance of Aldo's field performance to
support his position that Aldo is unreliable
involving this same vehicle and same
defendant. About two months after the June
24 stop, Officer Wheetley stopped Harris

again for a traffic infraction. On this stop,
Officer Wheetley again deployed Aldo, who
alerted to the same driver's side door handle.
A subsequent search of the huck revealed
only an open bottle of liquor and no illegal
substances.
Officer Wheetley testified to the issue of
residual odors. According to Officer
Wheetley, Aldo can pick up residual odors
of illegal drugs on an object when, for
example, someone has the odor on his or her
hand and touches a door handle. When
asked how long a residual odor can remain
on the handle, Officer Wheetley stated that
he was not qualified to answer that question.
Regarding the alert in this case, Officer
Wheetley testified that Aldo presumably
alerted to residual odor of meth on the door
handle, indicating that Officer Wheetley did
not believe that Aldo alerted to any of the
substances found in the vehicle ....
[T]he State argued that Officer Wheetley
had probable cause based on the totality of
the circumstances, which included the
expired tag, open container, nervousness,
and an alert by a trained and certified drugdetection dog. In challenging the issue of
probable cause, the defense argued that the
State failed to establish Aldo's reliability.
According to the defense, any dog can be
trained, but what matters most is that the
dog obtains positive results in the field. The
defense focused on the fact that on two
occasions (once on June 24, the stop at
issue, and once after the stop at issue) Aldo
alerted to Harris's truck and no drugs were
found that Aldo was trained to detect.
In an oral ruling, the trial court denied the
motion to suppress, found that there was
probable cause to search Harris's truck, and
admitted the physical evidence seized. The
trial court did not make a finding as to the
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dog's reliability
findings.

or

any

other

factual

Harris then entered a plea of no contest,
reserving the right to appeal the denial of the
motion. He was sentenced to twenty-four
months' incarceration and five years of
probation. On appeal, the First District
affirmed. Harris subsequently petitioned this
Court for discretionary review, which we
accepted based on express and direct
conflict between the First and Second
Districts.
THE CONFLICT ISSUE

The question presented to the First
District-and now to this Court-concerns
the evidence that the State must introduce to
establish that probable cause existed for the
warrantless search of a vehicle based on a
drug-detection dog's alert to the vehicle. To
clarify the conflict, we will outline the
approaches adopted by the First, Second,
Fourth, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal,
which have all addressed this issue.
The First, Fourth, and Fifth Districts agree
that the State can establish probable cause to
search a vehicle by demonstrating that a dog
is properly trained and certified to detect
illegal drugs. See Harris, 989 So.2d at 1215;
Laveroni, 910 So.2d at 336; Coleman, 911
So.2d at 261. None of the comis address
what would constitute "proper training and
certification," nor do they address the fact
that there is no statewide certification for
single-purpose drug-detection dogs. These
districts do not consider field performance
records to be irrelevant; their position is that
if the defendant wishes to challenge the
reliability of the dog, it is the defendant's
burden to introduce field performance
records of the dog or other evidence, such as
expert testimony....

The Second District has reached the
opposite conclusion on similar facts.
According to the Second District III
Matheson, "the fact that a dog has been
trained and certified, standing alone, is
insufficient to give officers probable cause
to search based on the dog's alert." The
Second District reasoned that "[a]n officer
who knows only that his dog is trained and
certified, and who has no other information,
at most can only suspect that a search based
on the dog's alert will yield contraband. Of
course, mere suspicion cannot justify a
search." ld. at 13. Thus, the Second District
concluded that "the most telling indicator of
what the dog's behavior means is the dog's
past performance in the field." Jd. at 15.
The Second District also discussed the issue
of residual odors:
[I]n this case Razor's trainer
acknowledged the tendency of
narcotics detection dogs to aleli on
the residual odors of drugs that are
no longer present.
This underscores one of three central
reasons why the fact that a dog has
been trained, standing alone, is not
enough to give an officer probable
cause to search based on the dog's
alert. Razor's trainer acknowledged
that a trained dog, doing what he has
been conditioned to do, imparts to
the officer merely that he detects the
odor of contraband. To be sure, as
the trainer maintained, this may not
be a false aleli when assessing the
success of the dog's conditioning.
But for Fourth Amendment purposes
it is neither false nor positive. The
presence of a drug's odor at an
intensity detectable by the dog, but
not by the officer, does not mean that
the drug itself is present.
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Id. at 13. The Second District then
enunciated concerns with relying solely on
evidence that the dog was trained or
"conditioned" to respond in patiicular ways
to patiicular stimuli .....

In this regard, the Second District highlighted that "conditioning and certification
programs vary widely in their methods,
elements, and tolerances of failure." Id. at
14 . . . . In rejecting the proposition that
evidence of training and certification alone
is sufficient to give probable cause to search
based on the dog's alert, the Second District
held that multiple factors should be
considered, including the exact training
received, the criteria for selecting the dogs
in the program, the standards the dog was
required to meet to successfully complete
the training program, and the "track record"
of the dog in the field, with an emphasis on
the number of mistakes the dog has made.
See id. at 14-15).
In Gibson, 968 So.2d at 631, the Second
District held that the State had failed to
establish that the drug-detection dog's alert
provided probable cause for the search ....
The Second District concluded that, under
Matheson, the officer's testimony was
inadequate to establish the dog's reliability.
ld.
As explained in our analysis below, we
agree with the Second District's bottom-line
conclusion that the State cannot establish
probable cause by introducing evidence only
that the dog was trained and celiified. We
disapprove of the conclusions of the First,
Fourth, and Fifth Districts that the State can
meet its burden of establishing probable
cause by presenting evidence that the dog is
trained and celiified to detect illegal drugs
and then shifting the burden to the defendant
to counter this evidence.

ANALYSIS
As previously stated, the question presented
concerns the showing that the State must
make to establish probable cause for a
warrantless search of a vehicle based on a
drug-detection dog's aleli to the vehicle.
This issue involves a trial court's
determination of the legal issue of probable
cause, which we review de novo. Ornelas v.
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).
However, we defer to a trial court's findings
of historical fact as long as they are
supported
by
competent,
substantial
evidence. See Connor v. State, 803 So.2d
598, 608 (Fla. 2001).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that "[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated."
U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also art. I, § 12,
Fla. Const. "[S]earches conducted outside
the judicial process, without prior approval
by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable
under
the
Fourth
Amendment-subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967).
One such exception to the warrant
requirement is the "automobile exception,"
first established by the United States
Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925). In Carroll, the United
States Supreme Court held that a warrantless
search of a vehicle based upon probable
cause to believe that the vehicle contains
contraband is not unreasonable within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at
149. The automobile exception of not
requiring a warrant is based on the inherent
mobility of vehicles, as well as the reduced
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expectation of pnvacy in a vehicle.
Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938
(1996). Although an individual has a
"reduced expectation of privacy in an
automobile, owing to its pervasive
regulation," id, he or she "does not
surrender all the protections of the Fourth
Amendment by entering an automobile,"
New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986) ....
The cases make clear that probable cause to
search a vehicle is based on the same facts
that would justify the issuance of a warrant.
See Dyson, 527 U.S. at 467 ....
The United States Supreme Court has
explained that the probable cause standard
"depends
on the
totality of the
circumstances." Maryland v. Pringle, 540
U.S. 366 (2003). "Probable cause exists
when 'there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place. '" United States
v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. at 95, (2006) . . . .
Probable cause is a "'practical, nontechnical
conception' that deals with 'the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act. '" ld at 370.
This Court, obliged to follow precedent
from the United States Supreme Court, has
explained:
An examination of Supreme Court
jurisprudence reveals a decidedly
broad definition of when law
enforcement officers have the
authority to engage in a warrantless
search: Probable cause exists where
"the facts and circumstances within
their (the officers') knowledge and
of which they had reasonably
trustworthy
information
[are]
sufficient in themselves to warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the

belief that" an offense has been or is
being committed.

State v. Betz, 815 So.2d 627 (Fla. 2002). The
burden is on the State to demonstrate that
the police had probable cause to conduct a
warrantless search. See Doctor v. State, 596
So.2d 442, 445 (Fla. 1992).
When it comes to the use of drug-detection
dogs, the United States Supreme Court has
explained that "the use of a well-trained
narcotics-detection dog-one that 'does not
expose noncontraband items that otherwise
would remain hidden from public view,'during a lawful traffic stop, generally does
not implicate legitimate privacy interests."
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409. Caballes and
Place considered the issue of whether the
use of a "well-trained" drug-detection dog
constitutes a search and not the
circumstances of how the trial court
determines whether the drug-detection dog
is well-trained and when the dog's alert will
constitute probable cause to believe that
there are illegal substances within the
vehicle.
Because the dog cannot be cross-examined
like a police officer whose observations at
the scene may provide the basis for probable
cause, the trial court must be able to assess
the dog's reliability by evaluating the dog's
training, certification, and performance, as
well as the training and experience of the
dog's handler. Similar to situations where
probable cause to search is based on the
information provided by informants, the trial
court must be able to evaluate the reliability
of the dog based on a totality of
circumstances. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 23031. A critical part of the informant's
reliability is the informant's track record of
giving accurate information in the past.
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Like the informant whose information forms
the basis for probable cause, where the dog's
alert is the linchpin of the probable cause
analysis, such as in this case, the reliability
of the dog to alert to illegal substances
within the vehicle is crucial to determining
whether probable cause exists. If a dog is
not a reliable detector of drugs, the dog's
alert in a particular case, by itself, does not
indicate that drugs are probably present in
the vehicle. In fact, if the dog's ability to
alert to the presence of illegal substances in
the vehicle is questionable, the danger is that
individuals will be subjected to searches of
their vehicles and their persons without
probable cause. Conversely, if a dog is a
reliable detector of drugs, the dog's ale1i in a
particular case can indicate that drugs are
probably present in the vehicle. In those
circumstances, the drug-detection dog's alert
will indicate to the officer that there is a
"fair probability that contraband" will be
found. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. Thus, to
determine whether the officer has a
reasonable basis for concluding that the
dog's ale1i indicates a fair probability that
contraband will be found, the trial cOUli
must be able to adequately make an
objective evaluation of the reliability of the
dog.
We conclude that when a dog ale1is, the fact
that the dog has been trained and ce1iified is
simply not enough to establish probable
cause to search the interior of the vehicle
and the person. We first note that there is no
uniform standard in this state or nationwide
for an acceptable level of training, testing, or
certification for drug-detection dogs. In
contrast to dual-purpose drug-detection
dogs, which are apparently certified by
FDLE, no such required certification exists
in this state for dogs like Aldo, who 1S a
single-purpose drug-detection dog.
In the absence of a uniform standard, the

reliability of the dog cannot be established
by demonstrating only that a canine is
trained
and
certified.
"[S]imply
characterizing a dog as 'trained' and
'certified' impmis scant information about
what the dog has been conditioned to do or
not to do, or how successfully." Matheson,
870 So.2d at 14. In other words, whether a
dog has been sufficiently trained and
certified must be evaluated on a case-bycase basis ....
One commentator has described the
"'mythic infallibility' of the dog's nose":
In cases involving dog sniffing for
narcotics it is pa1iicularly evident
that the courts often accept the
mythic dog with an almost
superstitious faith. The myth so
completely has dominated the
judicial psyche in those cases that the
courts either assume the reliability of
the sniff or address the question
cursorily; the dog is the clear and
consistent winner.
Andrew E. Taslitz, Does the Cold Nose
Knovv? The Unscientific Myth of the Dog
Scent Lineup, 42 Hastings L.J. 15, 22, 28
(1990). Another commentator has noted that
"not all dogs are well-trained and wellhandled, nor are all dogs temperamentally
suited to the demands of being a working
dog. Some dogs are distractible or
suggestible, and may alert improperly. Many
factors may lead to an unreliable ale1i."
Richard E. Myers II, Detector Dogs and
Probable Calise, 14 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1,
4 (2006).
Second, and related to the first concern, any
presumption of reliability based only on the
fact that the dog has been trained and
ce1iified does not take into account the
potential for false alerts, the potential for
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handler error, and the possibility of alerts to
residual odors. As the Second District aptly
observed, "[a]n officer who knows only that
his dog is trained and certified, and who has
no other information, at most can only
suspect that a search based on the dog's alert
will yield contraband. Of course, mere
SuspICIOn cannot justify a search."
Matheson, 870 So.2d at 13.
"A false [alert] is an alert by the dog in the
absence of the substance it is trained to
detect." Myers, s1lpra, at 12. False alerts
may lead to the search of a person who is
innocent of any wrongdoing. Id. Cases
demonstrate that the false-alert rate among
certified detection dogs varies significantly.
Lewis R. Katz & Aaron P. Golembiewski,
C1Irbing the Dog: Extending the Protection
of the F01lrth Amendment to Police Drug
Dogs, 85 Neb. L. Rev. 735 (2007).
Coupled with the concern for false alelis is
the potential for handler error and handler
cuing. "Handler error affects the accuracy of
a dog. The relationship between a dog and
its handler is the most impOliant element in
dog
sniffing,
providing
unlimited
oppOliunities for the handler to influence the
dog's behavior." Id. at 762. Therefore, the
trial court must also focus on the training of
the handler. "Handlers interpret their dogs'
signals, and the handler alone makes the
final decision whether a dog has detected
narcotics. Practitioners in the field reveal
that handler error accounts for almost all
false detections." Robert C. Bird, An
Examination of the Training and Reliability
of the Narcotics Detection Dog, 85 Ky. LJ.
405, 425 (1997).
A related problem is the possibility of
handler cuing. "Even the best of dogs, with
the best-intentioned handler, can respond to
subconscious cuing from the handler. If the
handler believes that contraband is present,

they may unwittingly cue the dog to alert
regardless of the actual presence or absence
of any contraband. Finally, some handlers
may consciously cue their dog to alert to
ratify a search they already want to
conduct." Myers, s1lpra, at 5.
An alert to a residual odor is different from a
false aleli, although both types of alerts may
result in subjecting the person and vehicle to
an invasive search when no contraband is
actually present. Because of the sensitivity
(or hypersensitivity) of a dog's nose, a dog
may alert to a residual odor, which may not
indicate the presence of drugs in the vehicle
at the time of the sniff:
Given the level of sensitivity that
many dogs possess, it is possible that
if the person being searched had
attended a party where other people
were using drugs, the dog would
alert because of the residue on
clothing or fabric. It is possible that
in a vehicle that had formerly been
used to transport drugs, the dog
would alert, despite the fact that
drugs were no longer present. Or it is
possible that some sort of residue
normally associated with drugs was
present.
Myers, s1lpra, at 4-5. Therefore, the alert
may not even mean that drugs were ever
present in the vehicle or on the person.
Because of these variables, a necessary part
of the totality of the circumstances analysis
in a given case regarding the dog's
reliability is an evaluation of the evidence
concerning whether the dog in the past has
falsely alerted, indicating that the dog is not
well-trained, or whether the alelis indicate a
dog who is alerting on a consistent basis to
residual odors, which do not indicate that
drugs are present m the vehicle.
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Accordingly, evidence of the dog's
performance history in the field-and the
significance of any incidents where the dog
alelied without contraband being found-is
part of a court's evaluation of the dog's
reliability under a totality of the
circumstances analysis. In particular, when
assessing the factors bearing on the dog's
reliability, it is important to include, as part
of a complete evaluation, how often the dog
has alerted in the field without illegal
contraband having been found.
The State argues that records of field
performance are meaningless because dogs
do not distinguish between residual odors
and drugs that are present and, thus, alerts in
the field without contraband having been
found are merely unverified alelis, not false
alerts. This assertion, if correct, raises its
own set of concerns as it relates to a
probable cause determination of whether the
dog's alert indicates a fair probability that
there are drugs presently inside the vehicle.

records and evidence that might challenge a
presumption of reliability-evidence that is
exclusively within the control of law
enforcement authorities and,
fmiher,
evidence that law enforcement agencies may
choose not to record, such as in this case.
Placing this burden on the defendant is
contrary to the well-established proposition
that the burden is on the State to establish
probable cause for a warrantless search. See
Doctor, 596 So.2d at 445. Because the State
must establish that the officer has a
reasonable basis for believing that his or her
dog is reliable in order to prove probable
cause based on the dog's alert, the State
carries the burden of presenting the
necessary records and evidence for the trial
court to consider in adequately evaluating
the dog's reliability.
Some cOUlis have adopted a similar totality
of the
circumstances
approach
to
determining a dog's reliability. See, e.g.,
State v. Ng1lyen, 726 N.W.2d 871 (S.D.
2007) ....

In any event, the record in this case does not
contain any testimony as to whether dogs
can be trained to distinguish between
residual odors and drugs and, further, there
were no field records or testimony presented
in this case in order to allow for a careful
examination of the significance of field
performance. Officer Wheetley was unable
to testify as to a complete picture of Aldo's
performance in the field. In future cases, the
State can explain the significance of the
percentage of unverified alerts in the field.
The trial court would then be able to
evaluate how any inability to distinguish
between residual odors and drugs that are
actually present bears on the reliability of
the alert in establishing probable cause.

Further, other courts have endorsed the trial
comi's consideration of multiple factors,
with emphasis on the number of "false
alerts" by the dog. For instance, in State v.
England, 19 S.W.3d 762, 768 (Tenn. 2000),
the Tennessee Supreme Court rejected a per
se rule that probable cause may be
established through a positive alert by a
trained narcotics detection dog. The court
reasoned
that
the
probable
cause
determination should turn on the dog's
reliability and that the trial court should
ensure that the dog is reliable by making
factual findings. Id The court set fOlih the
following framework for this required
reliability determination:

Finally, to adopt the view of the First,
Fourth, and Fifth Districts would be to place
the burden on the defendant to uncover all

Accordingly, in our view, the trial
comi, in making the reliability
determination may consider such
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factors as: the canine's training and
the canine's "track record," with
emphasis on the amount of false
negatives and false positives the dog
has furnished. The trial court should
also consider the officer's training
and experience with this palticular

canine.ld.
Additionally, in United States v. Florez, 871
F.Supp. 1411 (D.N.M. 1994), the United
States District Court for the District of New
Mexico observed that certified dogs have
falsely alerted and found the fact that a dog
is certified should not be sufficient to
establish probable cause. While analogizing
to an informant's tip, the court set forth the
following framework for a probable cause
analysis:
In summary, where adequate and
comprehensive
records
are
maintained on a particular narcotics
dog, and include results of controlled
alerts made in training, as well as
actual alelts in the field, the clog's
reliability could be sufficiently
established either through the records
themselves or testimony from the
dog's trainer who maintained the
records. In this respect, the dog's
alert is analogous to information
provided by a reliable informant, and
his alert without more could
establish probable cause.
However, where records are not kept
or are insufficient to establish the
dog's reliability, an alert by such a
dog is much like hearsay from an
anonymous
informant,
and
corroboration is necessary to support
the unproven reliability of the
alerting dog and establish probable
cause. To accept less would
compromise the very principles that

the requirement of probable cause
was designed to protect.

Id. at 1424. The court found support for this
position from United States v. Nielsen, 9
F.3d 1487, 1491 (lOth Cir. 1993). . . . In
sum, if the court relies only on training and
certification records and fails to consider
other factors concerning the dog's
performance, then the court does not have a
numerous
complete picture of the
circumstances that necessarily bear on the
reasonableness of the officer's belief in the
dog's reliability and whether the dog's alert
in a particular case indicates a fair
probability that there were drugs present
inside the vehicle.
For the above reasons, we adopt a totality of
the circumstances approach and hold that the
State, which bears the burden of establishing
probable cause, must present all records and
evidence that are necessary to allow the trial
court to evaluate the reliability of the dog.
The State's presentation of evidence that the
dog is properly trained and certified is the
beginning of the analysis. Because there is
no uniform standard for training and
certification of drug-detection dogs, the
State must explain the training and
certification so that the trial court can
evaluate how well the dog is trained and
whether the dog falsely alerts in training
(and, if so, the percentage of false alerts).
Further, the State should keep and present
records of the dog's performance in the
field, including the dog's successes (alerts
where contraband that the dog was trained to
detect was found) and failures ("unverified"
alerts where no contraband that the dog was
trained to detect was found). The State then
has the opportunity to present evidence
explaining the significance of any unverified
alerts, as well as the dog's ability to detect
or distinguish residual odors. Finally, the
State must present evidence of the
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experience and training of the officer
handling the dog. Under a totality of the
circumstances analysis, the court can then
consider all of the presented evidence and
evaluate the dog's reliability.
Contrary to the dissent's assertion that we
"impose[] evidentiaty requirements which
can readily be employed to ensure that the
police rely on drug detection dogs only
when the dogs are shown to be virtually
infallible," dissenting op. at 776, we do not
hold in this case that the dog must be shown
to be "virtually infallible." Just as it would
be entirely relevant to know how many
times an informant's tip resulted in
contraband being discovered, the reason that
the State should keep records of the dog's
performance both in training and in the field
is so that the trial court may adequately
evaluate the reasonableness of the officer's
belief in the dog's reliability under the
totality of the circumstances. Because the
State bears the burden of establishing
probable cause, if the courts are to make
determinations of probable cause based on
the alerts of dogs, who can neither be crossexamined nor otherwise independently
assessed as to their reliability, it is
appropriate to place the burden on the State
to ensure uniformity in the way dogs are
evaluated for reliability of their alelis.
Nothing less than the sanctity of our
citizens' constitutional rights to be secure
from unreasonable searches and seizures in
their homes, their vehicles, and their persons
is at stake.

THIS CASE
In applying these standards to Harris's case,
we hold that the trial comi erred in
concluding that the State presented
sufficient evidence to establish probable
cause to conduct a warrantless search of
Harris's truck. We defer to a trial comi's

findings of fact as long as they are supported
by competent, substantial evidence, but we
review de novo a trial comi's application of
the law to the historical facts. See Connor,
803 So.2d at 608; Pagan, 830 So.2d at 806.
However, in this case, the trial court did not
make findings of historical fact.
The State presented the following evidence:
Aldo had been trained to detect drugs since
January 2004 and certified to detect drugs
since February 2004; Officer Wheetley
trains Aldo for approximately four hours per
week, deploys Aldo approximately five
times per month, and attends a fOliy-hour
annual training seminar; and Aldo's success
rate during training is "really good." Aldo's
weekly training records reveal that from
November 2005 to June 2006, Aldo
performed satisfactorily 100% of the time.
However, there was no testimony as to
whether a satisfactory performance includes
any false alerts. The record is also scarce on
the details of Aldo's training, including
whether the trainer was aware of the
locations of the drugs and whether the
training simulated a variety of environments
and distractions.
The State also did not introduce Aldo's field
performance records so as to allow an
analysis of the significance of the alerts
where no contraband was found. In fact,
Officer Wheetley testified that he does not
keep records of Aldo's unverified alerts in
the field; he documents only Aldo's
successes. If an officer fails to keep records
of his or her dog's performance in the field,
the officer is lacking knowledge important
to his or her belief that the dog is a reliable
indicator of drugs. Cj Florida v. J.L., 529
U.S. 266 (2000).
The State asserts that the only relevant
records are the training records-not field
records-since there is no such thing as a

384

false alert in the field because a dog alerts to
both actual drugs and residual odors. Thus,
the State argues, when a dog alerts in the
field and no contraband is found, there is no
way to determine whether the dog was
alerting to a residual odor or whether the
dog falsely alerted. This is also of concern
when probable cause for the search hinges
on the dog's demonstrated reliability and
thus the probability that the dog's alert
indicates that contraband was present in the
vehicle at the time of the alert. Because the
State did not introduce field performance
records, the State was not able to explain the
significance of any unverified alerts in the
field.
Further, the State failed to present any
evidence regarding the criteria necessary for
AIda to obtain certification through Drug
Beat K-9 certifications. This case is unlike
Coleman, where evidence was introduced
outlining the details of the training program,
the criteria for choosing which dogs to use
as drug dogs, and the criteria necessary for
the dog and handler to pass the course and
obtain "cetiification." 911 So.2d at 260. By
contrast, the only evidence regarding the
criteria used in AIda's certification is a
document simply stating that AIda
successfully found twenty-eight grams of
marijuana, five grams of methamphetamine,
twenty-eight grams of cocaine, seven grams
of heroin, seven grams of crack cocaine, and
fifty grams of ecstasy. However, the record
is silent on the circumstances of the
certification, such as whether these drugs
were hidden, whether the trainer was aware
of the locations of the drugs, or whether the
certification simulated the variety of
environments and distractions found in the
field. In the absence of uniform, standard
criteria for certification, the State must do
more than simply introduce evidence that
the dog has been cetiified.

In this case, there are several other factors
that call into question AIda's reliability.
First, the State failed to present any
testimony regarding AIda's ability to detect
residual odors. When asked how long a
residual odor can remain on the driver's side
door handle, Officer Wheetley stated that he
was not qualified to answer that question.
While such testimony is not required,
without this information, it is difficult to
determine how this factor should apply, if at
all. For example, in State v. Cabral, 159
Md.App. 354 (2004), the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals held that even though
testimony was presented that the dog could
have alerted to a residual odor that was
seventy-two hours old, "such an ability
serves to strengthen the argument that the
dog has a superior sense of smell on which
to rely to support a finding of probable
cause." Alternatively, a trial court may find,
after evaluating the testimony and other
evidence, that a dog's inability to distinguish
between residual odors and actual drugs
undermines a finding of probable cause.
Second, the State has failed to explain why
an alert to a residual odor on the door handle
would give rise to probable cause in this
case. Officer Wheetley testified that AIda
alerted to the door handle and that, in his
experience, this meant that somebody had
touched or smoked narcotics and then
transferred the odor to the door handle.
Officer Wheetley further indicated that
AIda's aleti led him to believe that the odor
of narcotics was present on the door handle.
However, neither Officer Wheetley nor the
State has explained in this case why
evidence of residual odor of narcotics on the
vehicle's door handle gave rise to probable
cause that there were drugs actually present
in the vehicle at the time of the aleti. AIda's
alert to the door handle in this case, standing
alone, provides no basis for an objective
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probable cause determination that drugs
were present inside the vehicle.

has come into contact with drugs touched
the door handle at some point.

Thus, we conclude that the State did not
meet its burden in demonstrating that
Officer Wheetley had a reasonable basis for
believing that Aldo was reliable at the time
of the search and, thus, that Aldo's alert, the
linchpin of the probable cause analysis in
this case, indicated a fair probability that
drugs would be found in the vehicle.
Although the trial court found probable
cause, the trial court did not make a specific
finding as to Aldo's reliability. The failure
to make a finding on Aldo's reliability
makes it difficult to determine how much
weight to give Aldo's alert in the probable
cause analysis.

In sum, we conclude that the State has failed
to meet its burden of establishing probable
cause. In the absence of a reliable alert, the
other factors considered in the totality of
circumstances analysis-Harris's expired
tag, Harris's shaking, breathing rapidly, and
inability to sit still, and Harris's open beer
can-do not rise to the level of probable
cause that there were illegal drugs inside the
vehicle. Accordingly, the search of the
vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition on unreasonable searches and
seIzures.

Although not part of the determination of
whether probable cause to conduct the
search existed at that time, two additional
facts in this case are illustrative of why it is
important to engage in an inquiry of a dog's
reliability, including an evaluation of the
dog's performance in the field. First, as to
the search in question, the police officer did
not discover any drugs that Aldo was trained
to detect. In other words, there is a chance
that this case may have involved a false
alert. Second, Harris introduced evidence in
this case that Aldo alerted to the same door
handle on the same vehicle subsequent to
this arrest and no drugs were found.

For the above reasons, we quash Harris and
disapprove Coleman and Laveroni. We
approve Gibson and Matheson to the extent
that they are consistent with this opinion.
We hold the fact that a drug-detection dog
has been trained and certified to detect
narcotics, standing alone, is not sufficient to
demonstrate the reliability of the dog. To
demonstrate that an officer has a reasonable
basis for believing that an aleIt by a drugdetection dog is sufficiently reliable to
provide probable cause to search, the State
must present evidence of the dog's training
and certification records, an explanation of
the meaning of the particular training and
certification, field performance records
(including any unverified alerts), and
evidence concerning the experience and
training of the officer handling the dog, as
well as any other objective evidence known
to the officer about the dog's reliability. The
trial court must then assess the reliability of
the dog's alert as a basis for probable cause
to search the vehicle based on a totality of
the circumstances. Because in this case the
totality of the circumstances does not

The State argues that the alert at issue in this
case and the subsequent alert were not false
alerts because Aldo was alerting to residual
odor on the door handle; Officer Wheetley
also testified that when a dog alerts to a door
handle it usually means that residual odor
was transferred to the door handle by
someone who had handled drugs. However,
an alert to residual odor on the door handle,
by itself, indicates only that someone who

CONCLUSION
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support a probable cause determination, the
trial court should have granted the motion to
suppress. We remand for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

LEWIS, QUINCE, LABARGA, and
PERRY, JJ., concur. CANADY, c.J.,
dissents with an opinion. POLSTON, J.,
recused.
CANADY, C.J., dissenting.
Because the majority imposes an evidentiary
burden on the State which is based on a
misconception of the federal constitutional
requirement for probable cause, I dissent. I
would affirm the decision of the First
District Court of Appeal on review.

celiainties, but with probabilities." Texas v.
Bmwn, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983). The
probable cause standard "merely requires
that the facts available to the officer would
'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief''' that "evidence of a crime" may be
found. Id. "[I]t does not demand any
showing that such a belief be correct or
more likely true than false." Id. Instead, the
probable cause standard requires simply that
the search be justified by what the officer
reasonably believes to be "reasonably
trustwOlihy information." Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). The
majority here, however, imposes evidentiary
requirements which can readily be employed
to ensure that the police rely on drug
detection dogs only when the dogs are
shown to be virtually infallible.

In brief, the elaborate and inflexible
evidentiary requirements the majority adopts
are
inconsistent
with
the
proper
understanding of probable cause as a
"'practical, non-technical conception' that
deals with 'the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act. '" Maryland v. Pringle, 540
U.S. 366 (2003). In its effOli to manage the
conduct of law enforcement, the majority
strays beyond what is necessary to
determine if the Fourth Amendment's
proscription of "unreasonable searches and
seizures" has been violated. In establishing
requirements for determining the lawfulness
of a search based on the alert of a drug
detection dog, the majority demands a level
of certainty that goes beyond what is
required by the governing probable cause
standard.

The record shows that the searching officer
had an objectively reasonable basis for
crediting the dog's alert. The State presented
uncontroverted evidence that Aldo had been
trained to detect drugs since January 2004
and certified to detect drugs since February
2004. Officer Wheetley testified that he
trained Aldo approximately four hours per
week, deployed Aldo approximately five
times per month, and attended a forty-hour
annual training seminar. Wheetley described
Aldo's success rate during training as "really
good." Aldo's weekly training records
reveal that from the November 2005 to June
2006, Aldo performed satisfactorily 100
percent of the time. Harris failed to present
any evidence challenging Aldo's training or
certification. Based on this record of
historical facts, the majority's conclusion
that the officer acted unconstitutionally IS
totally
unwarranted.
See
Jones
v.
Commonwealth, 277 Va. 171 (2009).

The process of determining whether a search
was reasonable because it is based on
probable cause "does not deal with hard

Since there was no violation of the Fourth
Amendment, the decision of the First
District should be affirmed.
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"Justices to Decide Whether Detailed Proof is Needed in
Court on Drug Dog's Effectiveness"
The Washington Post
March 26, 2012
Associated Press
The Supreme Court will decide whether
detailed documentation is necessary in court
to prove that drug-sniffing dogs are effective
at finding contraband and drugs.
The high court decided Monday to hear an
appeal by Florida officials of the work done
by Aldo, a drug-sniffing dog used by the
Liberty County sheriff.
The Florida Supreme Court threw out drug
evidence obtained against Clayton Harris

during a 2006 traffic stop. Aldo alerted his
officer
to
drugs
used
to
make
methamphetamine inside the truck. But two
months later, Harris was stopped again,
Aldo again alerted his officer to the presence
of drugs but none were found.
The state court ruled that saying a drug dog
has been trained and certified to detect
narcotics is not enough to establish the dog's
reliability in court.
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"Florida Supreme Court Tosses Evidence
Detected by Drug-Sniffing Dogs"
The Tampa Bay Times
April 22, 2011

Citing a lack of state standards for drugsniffing dogs, the Florida Supreme Court on
Thursday tossed out evidence a canine
detected against a Panhandle man.
The 5-1 decision will make it more difficult
for prosecutors to get court approval to use
evidence sniffed out by trained dogs. But it
shouldn't hamper the ability of police to use
the animals, said Assistant State Attorney
Ted Daus, who specializes in drug cases in
Broward County.
"Because a dog cannot be cross-examined
like a police officer on the scene whose
observations often provide the basis for
probable cause to search a vehicle, the state
must introduce evidence concerning the
dog's reliability," Justice Barbara Pariente
wrote for the court.
Given the lack of statewide standards for
single-purpose, drug-detecting dogs, training
certificates and records aren't enough,
Pariente wrote.
Prosecutors also must present evidence
including field performance records and an
explanation of each dog's training. Proof of
the experience and training of the officer
handling the dog also is needed. FUliher, it's
the state's responsibility to prove a dog is
reliable, not the defendant's burden to show
otherwise, but Daus said that's not really a
change.
The prosecutor said the high cOUli has not
changed the standards for the dogs, but it
has increased the proof needed to verify
their reliability. He said it will turn what has

been a 15- to 20-minute procedure into one
that may take a couple of hours.
"Now, I have to put the proof
pudding," Daus said.

III

the

Chief Justice Charles Canady dissented.
"The majority demands a level of certainty
that goes beyond what is required by the
governing probable cause standard," Canady
wrote. He added the dogs will need "to be
virtually infallible."
The U.S. Supreme Court approved drugsniffing dogs to check vehicles during
routine traffic stops in 2005, but their
accuracy has remained an issue.
The Oregon Supreme Court also set
reliability criteria in a pair of rulings earlier
this month, and a Chicago Trib1lne analysis
of Illinois data in January showed the dogs
are wrong more often than they are right.
Last week, the Florida Supreme Court ruled
in another case that police must get a
warrant before using drug-sniffing dogs at
the front door of a home.
Attorney General Pam Bondi said she would
appeal that ruling to the U.S. Supreme
COUli. Her office had no immediate
comment on the latest decision.
It reversed a 1st District Court of Appeal
ruling that had upheld a judge's refusal to
suppress drug evidence obtained against
Clayton Harris during a 2006 traffic stop in
Liberty County.
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Sheriffs Deputy William Wheetley's dog
Aldo alerted to the driver's side door handle
after Harris refused to consent to a search of
his truck. Wheetley found more than 200
pseudoephedrine pills under the driver's seat
and 8,000 matches in eight boxes on the
passenger's side. A later search turned up

muriatic acid in a toolbox. All three items
are used to make methamphetamine. Two
months later, Wheetiey again stopped Harris
for a traffic infraction and Aldo again
alerted to the door handle, but this time no
illegal drugs were found.
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"The Reliability of Drug Sniffing Dogs"
Conc1Irring Opinions
April 1,2012
Erica Goldberg

Of the many things that make my Criminal
Procedure students cynical about the
Supreme Court, perhaps the most frustrating
is that the Court has refused to quantify the
probable cause standard. The Supreme
Court's grant of certiorari last week in
Florida v. Harris gives the Court the perfect
opportunity to at least place probable cause
within some numerical band.
Harris is a particularly good vehicle for
making the probable cause standard less
fuzzy. In Harris, the Florida Supreme Court
confronted the issue of when a dog's
positive alert gives the police probable cause
to search a vehicle. Unlike in most·
assessments of probable cause, which
involve informants or suspicious seeming
individuals, police have data that quantifies
the accuracy of drug sniffing dogs. A dog's
field history includes its rate of false
positives, when a dog alerts to the smell of
drugs that are not actually present in the
vehicle. The Florida Supreme Court held
that a dog's field history must be introduced
as part of the probable cause inquiry. If the
lower court's opmIOn is upheld, the
Supreme Court should tell us what sort of
false positive rate is too unreliable to permit
a full search of a car.
Courts consistently and expressly eschew
technical conceptions of probable cause in
order to provide police officers with
flexibility to exercise their judgment in
unfolding situations. In addition, courts
focus on whether an officer has a reasonable
belief that a suspect has committed or is
committing a crime. This metric allows for
probable cause to be found in situations

where one reasonable officer might assess
an 80% likelihood that a suspect is driving
drunk, for example, even if another
reasonable officer might think there is only a
40% likelihood. We might be tempted to
assume the courts require that a reasonable
officer be able to believe a crime has been
committed by greater than a 50% likelihood,
but this has not been made explicit. All
officers must prove to a court assessing a
vehicle search is a reasonable ground for
belief of guilt. FUliher, when a court is
making a probable cause determination for
itself in determining if a warrant should
issue, it must decide only if there is a "fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in a particular place."
What is a fair probability?
In the context of drug detection dogs, where
we have actual data on reliability, assigning
a numerical value to probable cause-or at
least to the maximum false positive
percentage upon which an officer can relywould add much needed clarity to Fourth
Amendment law. It also does not undermine
police officers' ability to use their intuition,
because the event precipitating a search is
not an officer's informed judgment, but the
alert from a dog.
The use of a drug detection dog by itself is
not considered a "search" that implicates
Fourth Amendment protections, but if the
dog alerts to the smell of drugs, the police
presume that they have the probable cause
required under the Fourth Amendment to
conduct an actual search of your vehicle.
However, if a particular dog is prone to false
positives, it cannot be said that there is a
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"fair probability" that contraband will be
found. As is expected in Fourth Amendment
law, the Florida Supreme Court opted to use
a "totality of the circumstances" approach to
assessing whether a dog's positive alert
yields probable cause, which the Florida
court defined as whether "the officer had a
reasonable basis for believing the dog to be
reliable." Florida courts now must consider
the dog's and the officer's training, field
performance records of the dog, and
anything else that bears on the dog's
reliability.
The Supreme Court may have granted cert
in Harris to overturn what it considers an
unduly burdensome evidentiary requirement
on the police. However, if the Florida
Supreme Court's decision is upheld, the
Supreme Court should decide numerically
what maximum false positive rate can still
yield probable cause, given the totality of
the circumstances. The Court should not
require the introduction of a dog's false
positive rate and then not advise lower
courts on what rates are permissible to

establish probable cause. If out of 100
positive alerts to cocaine by a particular dog,
the drug is found in only 50 of the cars, the
Court should decide whether a police officer
may search that car. Or, the Court should at
least tell lower courts what false positive
rates are inconsistent with probable cause as
a matter of law. (Complicating this issue is
the fact that a dog may alert to the residual
odor of a drug that is no longer present in
the car, and may not even belong to the car's
owner. Should this be considered a false
positive, since no contraband is presently in
the car?)
It would be a significant service to police,
individuals, and my inquiring law students if
the Court committed to a number and
required police to be at least that certain
before searching a vehicle. The virtues and
vices of rendering the law clearer and more
precise will be a theme for my blog posts in
April. I am so grateful for this opportunity to
guest blog for Concurring Opinions and
look forward to posting for the rest of the
month.
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United States v. Bailey
11-770
Ruling Below: United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, Bailey v.
United States, 11-770,2012 WL 1969365.

In 2005 Chunon Bailey left his apartment building as police were awaiting a search warrant in
the vicinity. An unmarked police car followed Bailey and then police detained him and brought
him back to the building. After the warrant arrived, the police searched the apartment and found
drugs and weapons. They arrested Bailey and charged with possession with intent to distribute,
possession of firearm by felon, and possession of firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking
crime. Bailey argued that police unconstitutionally detained him on the street and brought him
back to the apmiment. The trial judge ruled that if police could detain someone who was leaving
a place during a search, then police could also follow someone who has left the place being
searched and bring him back. Bailey filed a motion for to vacate his conviction, which was
denied. Bailey appealed.
Question Presented: Whether police officers may detain an individual incident to the execution
of a search warrant when the individual has left the immediate vicinity ofthe premises before the
warrant is executed.

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Chunon L. BAILEY, also known as Polo, Defendant-Appellant.

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Decided July 6, 2011
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.]
CABRANES, Circuit Judge

Chunon L. Bailey appeals from an August
23, 2007 judgment of conviction entered by
the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York (Joseph F.
Bianco, Judge), sentencing him principally
to concurrent terms of 300 and 120 months
of imprisonment, a consecutive term of 60
months of imprisonment, and five years of
supervised release. Bailey was convicted,
following a jury trial, of possession with
intent to distribute at least five grams of

cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(I) and 841 (b)(1)(B)(iii), possession
of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18
U.S.c. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), and
possession of a firearm in fmiherance of a
drug trafficking crime in violation of 18
U.S.c. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Bailey also
appeals from a January 19, 2010 order by
the District Court denying a motion to
vacate his conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 ("§ 2255"). United States v. Bailey,
No. 06-cr-232, 2010 WL 277069 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 19, 2010).
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We are asked to decide: (1) whether the
District Court erred in denying Bailey's
motion to suppress evidence obtained during
his detention because the search and seizure
of Bailey's person and property were
conducted in violation of his rights under the
Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. We hold that Bailey's
detention during the search of his residence
was justified pursuant to Michigan v.
Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981). The District
COUli therefore did not err in denying his
motion to suppress evidence obtained during
that detention. The District COUli's August
23, 2007 judgment of conviction and its
January 19,2010 order denying the § 2255
motion are affirmed.

BACKGROUND
The following facts reflect the findings
entered by the District Court in the
proceedings below, and, unless otherwise
indicated, are not in dispute.

A.
At 8:45 p.m. on July 28, 2005, Detective
Richard Sneider ("Sneider") of the Suffolk
County Police Depmiment ("SCPO")
obtained a search warrant from the First
District Court in the Town of Islip, New
York for the "basement apartment of 103
Lake Drive" in Wyandanch, New York, on
the basis of information from a confidential
informant. The search warrant provided that
the apaliment was "believed to be occupied
by an individual known as 'Polo', a heavy
set black male with ShOli hair," and
identified a "chrome .380 handgun" as the
principal target of the search. The search
warrant also stated that the basement
apartment at 103 Lake Drive is "located at
the rear of the premises[.]" The search
warrant did not specify that access to the
basement door at the rear of the house at 103

Lake Drive is possible from both the
basement apartment and from the house
upstairs.
At approximately 9:56 p.m. that evening,
Sneider and Detective Richard Gorbecki
("Gorbecki"), an eighteen-year veteran of
the SCPO assigned to the special operations
team for narcotics enforcement, observed
two men-later identified as Chunon L.
Bailey (the defendant) and Bryant
Middleton ("Middleton")-exiting the gate
at the top of the stairs that led down to the
basement of 103 Lake Drive. Both Bailey
and Middleton matched the description of
"Polo" provided to Sneider by the
confidential informant. They exited the yard
of the house and entered a black Lexus
parked in the driveway. Rather than confront
Bailey and Middleton within view or earshot
of the apartment, Sneider and Gorbecki
watched as Bailey's car pulled out of the
driveway and proceeded down the block.2
After the car traveled about a mile from the
house, the officers pulled the car over in the
parking lot of a fire station. Approximately
five minutes elapsed between Bailey's exit
from the basement apartment at 103 Lake
Drive and the stop.
After pulling over the vehicle, the detectives
conducted a "pat-down" of the driver,
Bailey, and passenger, Middleton, to check
for hard objects that could be used as
weapons. At Sneider's request, Bailey
identified himself and produced a driver's
license bearing a Bay Shore, New York
address. Nevertheless, he told Sneider that
he was coming from his house at "103 Lake
Drive" in Wyandanch, New York.
Middleton also identified himself and told
Gorbecki that Bailey was driving him home
in order to comply with a 10:00 p.m. curfew
imposed as a condition of Middleton's
parole. Middleton stated that Bailey's
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residence was 103 Lake Drive. At that point,
the officers placed Bailey and Middleton in
handcuffs and-in response to Bailey's
inquiry as to why they were being
"arrested"-informed both men that they
were being detained, but not arrested,
incident to the execution of a search warrant
in the basement apartment of 103 Lake
Drive. To that, Bailey responded, "I don't
live there. Anything you find there ain't
mine, and I'm not cooperating with your
investigation. "
Gorbecki drove Bailey's Lexus back to 103
Lake Drive, while Bailey and Middleton
were transpOlied back in a patrol car. Upon
arrival, Bailey and Middleton were informed
that, during the search, the SCPD "entry
team" had discovered a gun and dmgs in
plain view in the apartment. Bailey and
Middleton were placed under arrest and
Bailey's house and car keys were seized
incident to arrest. Later that evening, an
SCPO officer discovered that one of the
keys on Bailey's key ring opened the door of
the basement apartment. In total, less than
ten minutes elapsed between Bailey's stop
and his formal arrest.
B.

The evidence obtained during the search of
Bailey's home and his statements to
detectives Sneider and Gorbecki provided
the basis for the government's indictment.
Bailey moved, through counsel, to suppress
the physical evidence (including his house
and car keys) and his statements to
detectives Sneider and Gorbecki, on the
theory that he was unlawfully detained and
searched III violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
After holding an evidentiary hearing, the
District Court found Bailey's detention
lawful under Michigan v. Summers, 452

U.S. 692 (1981). The District Court
reasoned that the detectives' authority under
Summers to detain Bailey incident to a
search of the apartment was not strictly
confined to the physical premises of the
apartment so long as the detention occurred
as soon as practicable after Bailey departed
] 03 Lake Drive. ld. at 382. Moreover, the
District Court concluded, in the alternative,
that Bailey's detention was lawful as an
investigative
detention
supported
by
reasonable suspicion under Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968).Id. at 383-85.
A nine-day trial with respect to Count One
(possession with intent to distribute more
than five grams of cocaine base in violation
of 21
U.S.C.
§§
841 (a)(1)
and
841(b)(l)(B)(iii))
and
Count
Three
(possession of a firearm in furtherance of a
drug trafficking crime in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(A)(i)) commenced on
October 30, 2006. On November 8, 2006,
the jury returned a guilty verdict with
respect to both Counts.
On December 5, 2008, Bailey filed a motion
pursuant to § 2255 seeking to vacate his
conviction and order a new trial. Bailey's
sole argument was that his trial counsel
provided
constitutionally
ineffective
assistance by failing to introduce evidence
that access to the basement door at the rear
of 103 Lake Drive could be gained from
either the basement apatiment or the house
upstairs. Bailey asserted that when
detectives Sneider and Gorbecki observed
Bailey exit the gate at the back of the
property on July 28, 2005, they could not
have known whether he was leaving the
basement apatiment (for which they had a
search warrant) or the house upstairs (for
which they did not). Bailey argued that this
distinction was determinative in the District
Court's adjudication of the suppression
motion because the government could not
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sustain his detention under Summers or
provide the reasonable suspicion to sustain
his
detention
under
Terry
without
demonstrating conclusively that Bailey had
emerged from the basement apartment.
The District Court concluded that, even if
the detectives had known that access to the
basement hallway was possible from an
apartment other than the basement
apartment, they still would have had a
reasonable basis to believe that Bailey and
Middleton might have emerged from the
property for which they had a search
warrant. The detectives therefore had the
authority under SlImmers to briefly detain
Bailey in order to ascertain whether he was
an occupant of the premises being searched.
Indeed, as it turned out, the "undisputed
evidence at the trial [was] that this door to
the main house was not accessible to the
basement tenant and that the main house
was sealed off from the basement area."
United States v. Bailey, 2010 WL 277069, at
*10 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 19,2010).
Because the evidence regarding the layout of
the house had no effect on the lawfulness of
Bailey's detention, the District Court
reasoned that Bailey had not demonstrated
any prejUdice from his counsel's alleged
failure to offer that evidence. Accordingly,
Bailey had failed to satisfy the requirement
of Strickland that a successful claim for
of
counsel
ineffective
assistance
demonstrate that "there is a reasonable
probability that,
but for
counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different." 466
U.S. at 694.
Bailey appeals from the final judgment of
conviction entered by the District Court on
August 22, 2007, as well as from the
January 19, 2010 order denying Bailey's
motion to vacate the conviction pursuant to

§ 2255. On appeal, he makes substantially
the same claims he made before the District
Court in his suppression and § 2255
motions. However, he limits his arguments
on appeal to the lawfulness of his detention
pursuant to Summers and Terry and the
adequacy of his assistance at trial. Appellant
Br. 31,49,55.

DISCUSSION

A.
Appeals from the denial of a motion to
suppress evidence and a motion to vacate a
conviction pursuant to § 2255 are both
governed under the same standard of review:
we review the District COUli's factual
findings for clear error and its conclusions
of law de novo. United States v. LlIcky, 569
F.3d 10 1, 105-06 (2d Cir.2009). A finding
is clearly erroneous when "although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court
on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed." Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564,573 (1985).
B.

The basic parameters of our inquiry into the
lawfulness of a challenged seizure are wellknown. The Fourth Amendment proscribes
"unreasonable searches and seizures." In the
absence of probable cause, a limited and
temporary detention is generally permissible
only if law enforcement can establish
reasonable suspicion based on "specific and
articulable facts" as measured by an
objective standard. Terry, 392 U.S. at 2122. The Fourth Amendment, however,
"imposes no irreducible requirement of such
suspicion." United States v. MartinezFlIerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976). Instead,
as in all questions under the Fourth
Amendment, "the touchstone" of our
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analysis "is reasonableness." Palacios v.
B1Irge, 589 F.3d 556, 562 (2d Cir.2009).

SuspICIOn of criminal activity justifies a
detention of that occupant." ld. at 703-04.

In Michigan v. S1Immers, 452 U.S. 692
(1981), the Detroit police encountered
George Summers descending the front steps
of his house while they were preparing to
execute a search warrant of the premises.
Summers was detained during the search
and subsequently arrested when narcotics
were found in the house. ld. at 693. The
Supreme Comi upheld the initial detention,
explaining that "a warrant to search for
contraband founded on probable cause
implicitly carries with it the limited
authority to detain the occupants of the
premises while a proper search is
conducted." ld at 705. That is, the Court
concluded that the detention of "occupants"
even without individualized suspicion
during the execution of a valid search
warrant is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.

Weare now asked to decide whether the
same authority pursuant to which police
officers may detain an occupant at the
premises during the execution of a search
warrant permits them to detain an occupant
who leaves the premises during or
immediately before the execution of a search
warrant and is detained a few blocks away.
While we have extended Summers to permit
the detention of individuals entering a
vehicle in the driveway of a house, the
question presented here is a matter of first
impression in our Circuit.

The S1Immers Court explained that
compared with "the inconvenience [and] the
indignity associated with a compelled visit
to the police station," id. at 702, the
character of the "incremental intrusion"
caused by detention is slight and the
justifications for detention are substantial.
ld. at 703. In particular, the Court justified
the detention of George Summers by
reference to the interests of law enforcement
in (1) "preventing flight in the event that
incnmmating evidence is found"; (2)
"minimizing the risk of harm to the
officers"; and (3) facilitating "the orderly
completion of the search." ld. at 702-03.
Moreover, the Court observed that once "[ a]
judicial officer has determined that police
have probable cause to believe that someone
in the home is committing a crime[,] . . .
[t]he connection of an occupant to that home
gives the police officer an easily identifiable
and certain basis for determining that

This question has divided the Courts of
Appeals. Of the five comis to consider it,
three have extended S1Immers on facts
similar to those of this case. In United States
v. Cochran, 939 F.2d 337 (6th Cir.1991), for
example, police officers went to the
defendant's residence to execute a search
warrant and observed the defendant leaving
the premises. ld. at 338. The officers did not
want to forcibly enter the premises knowing
that there was a guard dog inside, and they
therefore stopped the defendant ShOlily after
he exited the house. ld. The Sixth Circuit,
relying on S1Immers, held that the detention
was reasonable, concluding that "S1Immers
does not impose upon police a duty based on
geographic proximity ( [i.e.,] defendant must
be detained while still on his premises);
rather, the focus is upon police performance,
that IS, whether the police detained
defendant as soon as practicable after
departing from his residence." ld. at 339.
Similarly, in United States v. Cavazos, 288
F.3d 706 (5th Cir.2002), police officers were
conducting pre-execution surveillance when
the defendant and two others left the
residence in a truck. ld. at 708. The officers
followed. ld. After the driver of the truck
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demonstrated his awareness that he was
being followed, the officers stopped the
vehicle, took the defendant back to the
residence, and detained him during the
search. Id. The Fifth Circuit observed that,
because the defendant's conduct "warranted
the belief that [the defendant] would have
fled or alerted the other occupants of the
residence about the agents nearby if he were
released immediately after the stop and
frisk," the detention was justified under
Summers. Id. at 711. Moreover, the Court
concluded that the nexus between the
defendant and the residence gave officers an
"easily identifiable and certain basis for
determining that suspicion of criminal
activity justifie[d] a detention of that
occupant." Id. (quoting S1Immers, 452 U. S.
at 703-04).

v. Sherrill, 27 F.3d 344 (8th Cir. 1994),
officers were conducting pre-execution
surveillance when the defendant left the
premises. Id. at 345. The officers stopped
him a block away, informed him that they
had a warrant to search the house, and
detained him during the search. Id. at 34546. The Eighth Circuit determined that,
because the defendant had left the area and
was unaware of the warrant, the officers did
not have any interest in preventing his flight;
the Court therefore held that Summers was
inapplicable. Id. at 346. Nevertheless, the
Court concluded that the police had probable
cause to arrest the defendant; in light of the
legal arrest, "the crack and cash discovered
in a later search of his person was legally
seized as a search incident to arrest." Jd. at
347.

Most recently, in United States v. Bullock,
632 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir.2011), officers
conducting
pre-execution
surveillance
observed the defendant exit the house and
enter a vehicle with the resident of the house
and her children. Id. at 1009. Officers
followed the vehicle and executed a stop
about ten to fifteen blocks from the house,
transpOliing all of the occupants of the
vehicle back to the house after notifying the
driver that a search was underway. Id. The
Seventh Circuit concluded that-in the
absence of anything "to suggest that the
vehicle was not pulled over as soon as
practicable"-the conduct of the officers
was reasonable. Id. at 1020. The Court
observed that "[0 ]nce aware of the warrant,
[Bullock] became a flight risk and a
potential risk to the officers' safety in
executing the warrant given his suspected
illegal association with the residence." Id.

Second, in United States v. Edwards, 103
F .3d 90 (10th Cir.1996), police were
conducting pre-execution surveillance of a
"drug house" when the defendant, an exconvict in a drug rehabilitation program, left
the building. Id. at 91. The officers detained
him on the street for forty-five minutes. Id.
Like the Eighth Circuit in Sherrill, the Tenth
Circuit concluded that because the defendant
was unaware that a warrant was being
executed, he had no reason to flee. Id. at 94.
Furthermore, the COUli reasoned that the
defendant did not pose a risk of harm to the
officers and his detention played no pati in
facilitating the orderly completion of the
search.ld.

Two circuits have declined to extend
Summers to permit detention of occupants
who have been seen leaving a residence
subject to a search warrant. In United States

We agree with the District Court that the
Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits have the
better of this argument. The guiding
principle behind the requirement of
reasonableness for detention ill such
circumstances is the de minimis intrusion
characterized by a brief detention in order to
protect the interests of law enforcement in
the safety of the officers and the
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preservation of evidence. See Summers, 452
U.S. at 701. We agree with the District
Court that "[t]here is no basis for drawing a
'bright line' test under Summers at the
residence's curb and finding that the
authority to detain under S1lmmers always
dissipates once the occupant of the residence
drives away." Bailey, 468 F.Supp.2d at 379.
While the Eighth and Tenth Circuits
apparently concluded that once an occupant
leaves a premises subject to search without
knowledge of the warrant, S1lmmers is
inapplicable because he ceases to (1) be a
threat to the officers' safety, (2) be in a
position to destroy evidence, or (3) be able
to help facilitate the search, we conclude
that it is the very interests at stake in
S1lmmers that permit detention of an
occupant nearby, but outside of, the
premises. Indeed, adopting the Eighth and
Tenth Circuits' view as the law of the
Circuit would put police officers executing a
warrant in an impossible position: when they
observe a person of interest leaving a
residence for which they have a search
warrant, they would be required either to
detain him immediately (risking officer
safety and the destruction of evidence) or to
permit him to leave the scene (risking the
inability to detain him if incriminating
evidence was discovered). Summers does
not necessitate that Hobson's choice,
particularly when "[ a] judicial officer has
determined that police have probable cause
to believe that someone in the home is
committing a crime." S1lmmers, 452 U.S. at
703. Indeed, to accept that argument would
be to strip law enforcement of the capacity
to "exercise unquestioned command of the
situation," id., at precisely the moment when
S1lmmers recognizes they most need it.
The District Court was therefore correct
when it noted that "Summers . .. appl[lies]
with equal force when, for officer safety

reasons, police do not detain the occupant on
the curbside, but rather wait for him to leave
the immediate area and detain him as soon
as practicable." Bailey, 468 F.Supp.2d at
381 n. 4.6 That is, Summers imposes upon
police a duty based on both geographic and
temporal proximity; police must identify an
individual in the process of leaVing the
premises subject to search and detain him as
soon as practicable during the execution of
the search. As the Fifth Circuit concluded in
Cavazos, while "[t]he proximity between an
occupant of a residence and the residence
itself may be relevant in deciding whether to
apply Summers, . . . it is by no means
controlling." 288 F.3d at 712.
Against that standard, we have no trouble
concluding that Bailey's detention was
lawful under the Fourth Amendment. The
officers' decision to wait until Bailey had
driven out of view of the house to detain
him out of concern for their own safety and
to prevent alerting other possible occupants
was, in the circumstances presented,
reasonable and prudent. There is no question
that because the target of the search warrant
was a gun, Bailey-who matched the
description of "Polo" provided by the
confidential informant-posed a risk of
harm to the officers. As the Supreme Comi
stated in S1lmmers, "the execution of a
warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of
transaction that may give rise to sudden
violence or frantic efforts to conceal or
destroy evidence." 452 U.S. at 702. In light
of the fact that the officers had reason to
suspect that the occupant of 103 Lake Drive
sold drugs out of the house and had a gun in
his possession, it was reasonable for the
officers to assume that detaining Bailey
outside the house might lead to the
destruction of evidence or unnecessarily risk
the safety of the officers. These are precisely
the concerns that justified the limited
intrusion in S1lmmers, 452 U.S. at 701-03.
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Finally, Bailey's detention was not
"unreasonably prolong[ed]." United States v.
Harrison, 606 F.3d 42, 45 (2d Cir.20 10). He
was detained for less than ten minutes
before he was taken back to 103 Lake Drive.
By the time he returned to the site of the
search, the search was underway and he was
formally placed under arrest within five
minutes of the entry team's execution of the
warrant. Of equal importance, officers did
not attempt to exploit the detention by trying
to obtain additional evidence from Bailey
during execution of the search warrant.
Because the officers acted as soon as
reasonably practicable in detaining Bailey
once he drove off the premises subject to
search, we conclude that his detention
during the valid search of the house did not
violate the Fourth Amendment. The District
Court did not err in denying Bailey's motion

to suppress the evidence obtained as a result
of his detention. Bailey, 468 F.Supp.2d at
382.
CONCLUSION
To summarize, we conclude that:
(1) Bailey's detention during the search of
his residence was justified pursuant to
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981),
because he was (a) an occupant of propeliy
subject to a valid search warrant, (b) seen
leaving the premises during the execution of
the warrant, and (c) detained as soon as
reasonably practicable thereafter.
The District Court's August 23, 2007
judgment of conviction and its January 19,
2010 order denying Bailey's § 2255 motion
are affirmed.
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"Supreme Court to Decide Chunon Bailey Case on Whether
Police Can Detain Without a Warrant"
USA Today
June 4, 2012
Associated Press
The Supreme Court will decide whether
police can follow and detain a suspect while
they wait for a search warrant, even after the
suspect leaves the area that the police want
to search.
The high court on Monday agreed to hear an
appeal from Chunon Bailey, who was
sentenced to 30 years in prison on drug and
weapons charges.
Bailey left a building with an apatiment that
police wanted to search for a gun before the
warrant arrived. An unmarked police car
followed Bailey for more than a mile, and
police detained him and brought him back to
the building. The warrant arrived, police
found drugs and weapons and arrested

pocket.
Bailey said police unconstitutionally stopped
him on the street and brought him back to
the apartment. But the trial judge ruled that
if police could detain someone who was
leaving a place during a search, then police
could also follow someone who has left the
place being searched and bring them back.
The 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
refused to throw out his conviction, but
other federal appeals courts have ruled that
police cannot follow and detain people just
to bring them back to a place that has not
been searched yet. The Supreme Court will
hear arguments in the fall.
The case is Bailey v. United States, 11-770.

Bailey, who had an apartment key in his

401

"Second Circuit Upholds Detention of Person Leaving
Scene of Search Warrant"
Taking the Fifth
July 12,2011
C. Zadik Shapiro
In Michigan v. Summers the Supreme Court
held that a search warrant for a residence
allows officers to detain those in the
residence during the search and that this
right extended to a man leaving the
residence as officers entered. In United
States v. Bailey the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, last week, extended the permissible
detention to an individual the officers saw
drive away from the residence in order to
allow them to follow and stop the individual.
The officers then brought the individual
back to the residence and detained him until
the search was over.
With a search warrant for a basement
apartment at 103 Lake Drive in Wyandanch,
New York officers arrived at the residence.
They saw two men, one of them Chunon
Bailey leave the unit and drive away. They
followed the vehicle, stopped it and brought
the men back to the residence. Bailey was
detained and he was arrested after guns and
drugs were found in the residence.
In Summers the Supreme COUli provided
three reasons to justify the detention of
someone
leaving
a
residence:
(1 )
"preventing flight in the event that
incriminating evidence is found"; (2)
"minimizing the risk of harm to the
officers"; and (3) facilitating "the orderly
completion of the search." In a footnote the
Second Circuit says that the first and second
criteria apply. But it gives no facts to
support this view. In another footnote it
states that the police officers testified that
the reason they didn't immediately detain
Bailey was that they were afraid that by

doing so they would alert anyone else in the
house to the police presence and a
dangerous situation may result.

It is one thing to follow the Supreme Court's
criteria. It is another to make a blanket
holding. The Second Circuit held, "that
Summers authorizes law enforcement to
detain the occupant of premises subject to a
valid search warrant when that person is
seen leaving those premises and the
detention is effected as soon as reasonably
practicable."
This issue may come before the Supreme
COUli. The Circuit Courts are divided. The
Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, like the
Second Circuit, upheld detentions of people
after they left the scene. The Eighth and the
Tenth Circuits ruled to the contrary. They
held that once a person left the residence the
Summers criteria are no longer applicable. If
the person leaves the scene without knowing
that a surveilance is in progress then the
officers are not in danger. The Second
Circuit's response is that the officers are
required to make a difficult decision: either
to detain Bailey outside the residence and
possibly notify those inside that the police
are present or to let Bailey, who they call a
"person of interest to leave without being
detained. While the search warrant indicates
that a judge found probable cause to believe
that someone in the residence may have
committed a crime at the time of the
detention there was no individualized
suspicion, as required by Terry that Bailey
committed a crime and he should not have
been detained. When you detain someone a
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mile away from the house, return they to the
house and require them to wait until the
search is over it is no longer the minimal

intrusion found by the Supreme Court
Summers.

In
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King v. Maryland
No.12A48
Ruling Below: King v. State, 422 Md. 550 (2011).
Alonzo Jay King Jr., was arrested in 2009 on first- and second-degree assault charges. In
accordance with §2-504(3) of the Maryland DNA Collection Act, King's DNA was collected,
analyzed, and entered into Maryland's DNA database. King was convicted on the second-degree
assault charge but while awaiting trial on that charge, his DNA profile generated a match to a
DNA sample collected from a sexual assault victim in an unsolved 2003 rape. Maryland law
enforcement authorities cited the DNA evidence as probable cause for a grand jUly indictment of
King on the rape charge. Later, a search warrant for collection from King an additional reference
DNA sample, which matched the DNA profile from the 2003 rape. King was convicted of firstdegree rape and sentenced to life in prison. King appealed, arguing that taking his DNA sample
that linked him to the 2003 rape violated his Fourth Amendment right.

Question Presented: 1. Did the trial court err by denying Appellant's motion to suppress DNA
evidence obtained through a warrantless search conducted without any individualized suspicion
of wrongdoing? 2. Did the court below improperly shift the burden of proof to the defense to
demonstrate that a search or seizure made without individualized suspicion is unreasonable?

Alonzo Jay KING, Jr.

v.
STATE of Maryland.
Court of Appeals of Maryland
Filed April 24,2012
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.]

HARRELL, Judge
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The tale of this case began on 10 April 2009,
when appellant was arrested in Wicomico
County, Maryland, on first- and seconddegree assault charges unrelated to the rape
charge underlying the prosecution of the
present case. Prior to the disposition of the
assault charges, because King was charged
with a crime of violence, the Act authorized
collection of a DNA sample. Personnel at

the Wicomico County Central Booking
facility used a buccal swab to collect a DNA
sample from King on the day of his arrest.
The sample was received and processed by
the Maryland State Police Forensic Sciences
Division and later analyzed by a private
vendor laboratory. On 13 July 2009, the
DNA record was uploaded to the Maryland
DNA database. Detective Barry Tucker of
the Salisbury Police Department received
notice from the State Police, on 4 August
2009, that there had been a "hit" on King's
DNA profile in an unsolved rape case.
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The DNA database "hit" identified King's
DNA profile as a match to a profile
developed from a DNA sample collected in
a 2003 unsolved rape case in Salisbury,
Maryland. In that case, on 21 September
2003, an unidentified man broke into the
home ofVonette W., a 53-year-old woman,
and raped her. Salisbury Police officers
arranged for the victim to be transported to
Peninsula Regional Medical Center, where
she underwent a sexual assault forensic
examination. Semen was collected from a
vaginal swab. The swab was processed and
the DNA profile uploaded to the Maryland
DNA database. No matches resulted at that
time. Vonette W. was unable to identify the
man who attacked her other than to say that
he was African-American, between 20 and
25 years old, five-foot-six inches tall, and
with a light-to-medium physique.
Detective Tucker presented the 4 August
2009 DNA database "hit" to a Wicomico
County grand jury which, on 13 October
2009, returned an indictment against King
for ten charges arising from the crimes
committed against Vonette W., including
first-degree rape. The DNA database "hit"
was the only evidence of probable cause
supporting the indictment. On 18 November
2009, Detective Tucker obtained a search
warrant and collected a second buccal swab
from King. The second buccal swab
matched also the sample collected from
Vonette W. during the 2003 sexual assault
forensic examination.
King filed in the Circuit Court for Wicomico
County an omnibus motion that included a
request to suppress evidence obtained
through an illegal search and seizure. On 12
February 2010, the Circuit Court held a
hearing on the motion.
On 26 February 2009, the hearing judge
issued a memorandum opinion denying

King's
motion
to
suppress.
The
OpInIOn
upheld
the
memorandum
constitutionality of the Maryland DNA
Collection Act's authorization to collect
DNA from arrestees, citing to this Court's
holding in State v. Raines, 383 Md. 1, 857
A.2d 19 (2004), and concluded that the
arrest of King on the 2009 assault charges
and seizure of his DNA were presumed
lawful; therefore, the defense bore the
burden to prove that the warrant for the
second DNA sample was invalid.
On 26 March 2010, the same judge presided
over a second hearing on King's motion to
suppress in order to allow King to present
evidence that the warrant was based on
falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth.
The hearing judge concluded that King
failed to meet his burden and denied again
the motion to suppress.
Ultimately, King plead not guilty to the
charges arising from the 2003 rape of
Vonette W., on an agreed statement of facts,
in order to preserve his right to appeal the
constitutional issues he raised. King was
convicted and sentenced to life in prison,
without the possibility of parole. On 12
October 2010, King filed timely a notice of
appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, but
we issued a writ of certiorari on our
initiative, King v. State, 422 Md. 353, 30
A.3d 193 (2011), before the intermediate
appellate comi could decide the appeal.
We hold that § 2-504(3) of the Maryland
DNA Collection Act, which allows DNA
collection from persons arrested, but not yet
convicted, for crimes of violence and
burglary, is unconstitutional, under the
Fourth Amendment totality of the
circumstances balancing test, as applied to
the relevant facts of this case because King's
expectation of privacy is greater than the
State's purpOlied interest in using King's
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DNA to identify him for purposes of his 10
April 2009 arrest on the assault charges.
II. Standard of Review
Reviewing a trial court's disposition of a
motion to suppress evidence, we view the
evidence presented at the hearing, along
with any reasonable inferences drawable
therefrom, in a light most favorable to the
prevailing party, which, in the present
situation, was the State. The reviewing court
defers to the fact-finding of the hearing
court, unless the findings are erroneous
clearly. We apply, however, a nondeferential standard of review when making
the ultimate legal determination as to
whether the evidence was seized properly
under the Fourth Amendment.
III. Discussion
Appellant
argues
that
the
Fourth
Amendment protects mere arrestees, who
are cloaked with the assumption of
innocence until proven guilty, from
unreasonable, warrantless, and suspicionless
seizures and searches of their genetic
material made pursuant to the Maryland
DNA Collection Act.
A. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides,
The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects,
against
unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, suppOlted
by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.

The FOUlth Amendment is applicable to
Maryland
through
the
Fourteenth
We
evaluate
Fourth
Amendment.
Amendment
challenges
under
the
reasonableness test articulated by Justice
Harlan in his concurring opinion in Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967), a
standard adopted by this Court in Venner v.
State, 279 Md. 47, 51-52, 367 A.2d 949,
952 (1977). The Katz reasonableness test
requires first that the person have an "actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable. '" A seizure or search will be
upheld even if there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy when the government
has a "special need." The State does little
more than mention the special needs
exception in the present case, for good
reason, because its narrow confines do not
embrace the case at bar.
The context for evaluating the Fourth
Amendment challenges where a reasonable
expectation of privacy competes with
government interests was set forth by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Knights,
534 U.S. 112 (2001). In Knights, the
Supreme COUlt upheld a warrantless search
of a probationer'S apartment, using the
"totality of the circumstances" approach set
forth in Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39
(1996). Reasonableness m a Fourth
Amendment analysis is determined by
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to
which it intrudes upon an individual's
privacy and, on the other, the degree to
which it is needed for the promotion of
legitimate government interests.
B. The Maryland DNA Collection Act

The Maryland DNA Collection Act was
enacted in 1994. The portions of the current
statute challenged by Appellant were added
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in 2008. The stated purpose of the statute is
to "analyze and type the genetic markers
contained in or derived from the DNA
samples;" to assist an official investigation
of a crime; to identify human remains; to
identify missing persons; and for "research
and administrative purposes," including the
development of a population database and to
aid in quality assurance. The 2008
amendments affected primarily § 2-501(i),
Definitions and § 2-504, Collection of DNA
Samples. The amendments purport to allow
the State to collect DNA samples from
individuals arrested for crimes (or attempted
crimes) of violence or burglary prior to
being found guilty or pleading guilty. DNA
samples are collected from arrestees when
the individual is charged (or at a correctional
facility if the arrestee is in custody) by an
authorized collector trained in the collection
protocols used by the Maryland State Police
Crime Laboratory. Samples may be
collected with reasonable force, if necessary,
and are mailed to the Maryland State Police
Crime Laboratory within 24 hours of
collection. The samples are not tested or
placed in the statewide DNA system until
the first scheduled arraignment of the
arrestee, or earlier if the arrestee gives
consent.
If an arrestee is not convicted of the charge
or charges which lead to his/her qualifying
arrest(s), the DNA samples and records are
required to be destroyed or expunged by the
authorities. There is no expungement
allowed, however, if the precipitating charge
or charges against an arrestee are placed on
the stet docket or the arrestee received
probation before judgment. The Act
provides also for penalties for misuse of
DNA records, unauthorized testing of DNA
samples, or wilful failure to destroy DNA
samples.
In Raines, 383 Md. at 25, 857 A.2d at 33, a

plurality of this Court upheld the
constitutionality,
against
a
Fourth
Amendment challenge, of the then-extant
DNA collection statutory scheme, which,
prior to the 2008 amendments, provided for
collection of DNA samples only from
individuals convicted of felonies, fourthdegree burglary, or breaking and entering
into a vehicle. The Court, however, was
divided deeply in reaching that result. The
plurality opinion was authored by Judge
Cathell. Two members of the four judge
majority authored separate concurring
opinions.
Raines was convicted of two separate
robberies committed in 1996. In 1999, while
serving a sentence in prison for a crime
unrelated to the robberies, his DNA was
collected pursuant to the Act as it then
existed, because the 1996 robberies were
qualifying felonies. In 2002, the DNA
profile from a 1996 unsolved rape was
uploaded to the statewide database and
found to match Raines's DNA profile
collected in 1999. Using the DNA database
hit as probable cause, the State obtained a
search warrant to obtain a saliva sample
from Raines in February 2003. As a result of
the second DNA profile match and the
testimony of the 1996 rape victim, a grand
jury returned an indictment against Raines
for first- and second-degree rape and
robbery. Prior to his trial on the rape
charges, Raines moved to suppress the DNA
evidence, asserting that the original search
was unconstitutional. The motions court
agreed. The plurality opinion, on appeal,
reversed the suppression of the evidence,
noting that nearly every federal and state
court that had decided an analogous question
upheld against Fourth Amendment attack
the collection of DNA from convicted
felons. Using the balancing test for
determining whether a search is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment, the plurality
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upheld the constitutionality of the Maryland
DNA Collection Act, as applied to convicted
felons.
On the privacy interest side of the scales of
the balancing test, the Court considered
Raines's status as a convicted and
incarcerated person as one with "severely
diminished expectation of privacy." The
plurality opinion diluted further Raines's
expectation of privacy by crediting that the
purpose of the DNA collection was to
"identify" convicted felons; no incarcerated
individual has an expectation of privacy in
his or her identity. The Court distinguished
the interest in searching for "identification"
from searching "ordinary individuals for the
purpose of gathering evidence against them
in order to prosecute them for the very
crimes that the search reveals." Using the
Knights test, the COUli concluded that there
is no reason why a search cannot be
reasonable
absent
an
individualized
suspicion in the limited circumstances of
this case, where the individual's expectation
of privacy was even more limited than in
Knights, the government intrusion, a buccal
swab, was minimal at most and the
government objective is as strong as in
Knights.
A government interest highlighted in Raines
was to identify recidivists, persons involved
with crimes, and unidentified bodies. Judge
Raker's concurring opinion disagreed with
the plurality opinion as to its conclusion of
the severely limited expectation of privacy a
convicted felon has in his/her bodily fluids,
but upheld the statute based on her
acceptance of the analogy between
fingerprints and DNA profiles as providing
purely identifying information. In a separate
concurring opinion, Judge Wilner criticized
the plurality opinion's characterization of
the State's interest in the DNA as simply
identification, calling it "misleading even to

suggest, much less hold, that this program is
not designed for the predominant purpose of
providing evidence of criminality." He
conceded, however, that convicted criminals
have a high rate of recidivism and that
DNA's reliability serves the government's
interest in identification in the same way as
fingerprints and photographs do.

C. The Present Case
We
consider first
whether King's
constitutional challenge to the Maryland
DNA Collection Act is as-applied, facially,
or both. It is clear in the present case that
King mounts both facial and as-applied
Fourth Amendment challenges.
Under Maryland common law, there is a
strong presumption that statutes are
constitutional. To succeed in an as-applied
constitutional challenge, King must show
that "under [these] particular circumstances
[he was] deprived ... of a constitutional
right. "
To evaluate King's as-applied challenge, we
analyze the totality of the circumstances,
using the Knights balancing test that weighs
King's expectation of privacy on one hand
and the state's interests on the other, keeping
in mind that the "touchstone" of Fourth
Amendment analysis is reasonableness. Our
analysis is influenced also by the precept
that the government must overcome a
presumption that warrantless, suspicion less
searches are per se unreasonable. As other
courts have concluded, we look at any DNA
collection effort as two discrete and separate
searches. The first search is the actual swab
of the inside of King's mouth and the second
is the analysis of the DNA sample thus
obtained, a step required to produce the
DNA profile. Although some comis follow
Mitchell in assessing the buccal swab
technique as a quick and painless intrusion,
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we shaH not ignore altogether the gravity of
a warrantless search and collection of
biological material from a mere arrestee.
The State bears the burden of overcoming
the arrestee's presumption of innocence and
his expectation to be free from biological
searches before he is convicted of a
qualifying crime. If application of the
balancing test results in a close call when
considering convicted felons, as our deeply
divided decision in Raines suggests, then the
balance must tip surely in favor of our
closely-held belief in the presumption of
innocence here. King's expectation of
privacy is greater than that of a convicted
felon, parolee, or probationer, and the
State's interests are more attenuated
reciprocally.
i. King's Expectation of Privacy

King must have a personal, subjective
expectation of privacy in order for Fourth
Amendment protections to apply.
We do not embrace wholly the analogy
between fingerprints and DNA samples
advanced in Judge Raker's concurring
opinion in Raines and by the State in the
present case. As aptly noted, fingerprints are
a physical set of ridges on the skin of a
person's fingers that, when exposed to ink
(or other medium) and the resultant imprint
placed on paper or electronic records, can
determine usually and accurately a person's
identity by matching the
physical
characteristics to a known set of
fingerprints. DNA, on the other hand, is
contained within our cells and is collected
by swabbing the interior of a cheek (or
blood draw or otherwise obtained biological
material). While the physical intrusion of a
buccal swab is deemed minimal, it remains
distinct from a fingerprint. We must
consider that "[t]he importance of informed,

detached and deliberate determinations of
the issue whether or not to invade another's
body in search of evidence of guilt is
indisputable and great."
The information derived from a fingerprint
is related only to physical characteristics and
can be used to identify a person, but no
more. A DNA sample, obtained through a
buccal swab, contains within it unarguably
much more than a person's identity.
Although the Maryland DNA Collection Act
restricts the DNA profile to identifying
information only, we cannot turn a blind eye
to the vast genetic treasure map that remains
in the DNA sample retained by the State. As
Judge Wilner noted in his concurring
opinion in Raines,
A person's entire genetic makeup
and history is forcibly seized and
maintained in a government file,
subject only to the law's direction
that it not be improperly used and the
of
a
misdemeanor
prospect
conviction if a custodian willflllly
discloses it in an unauthorized
manner. No sanction is provided for
if the information is non-willfully
disclosed in an unauthorized manner,
though the harm is essentiaHy the
same.
Although arrestees do not have all
the expectations of privacy enjoyed
by
the
general
public,
the
presumption of innocence bestows
on them greater protections than
convicted felons, parolees, or
probationers.
A
judicial
determination
of
criminality,
conducted
properly,
changes
drastically an individual's reasonable
expectation
of
privacy.
The
expungement provisions of the Act
recogmze the importance of a
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conviction in altering the scope and
reasonableness of the expectation of
privacy. If an individual is not
convicted of a qualifying crime or if
the original charges are dropped, the
DNA sample and DNA profile are
destroyed. The General Assembly
recognized the full scope of the
information collected by DNA
sampling and the rights of persons
not convicted of qualifying crimes to
keep this information private. This
right should not be abrogated by the
mere charging with a criminal
offense: the arrestee's presumption
of innocence remains.
We agree with the Minnesota Court of
Appeals in C. T.L. that "establishing
probable cause to arrest a person is not, by
itself, sufficient to permit a biological
specimen to be taken from the person
without first obtaining a search warrant." A
finding of probable cause for arrest on a
crime of violence under the Maryland DNA
Collection Act cannot serve as the probable
cause for a DNA search of an arrestee.

ii. Government Interest
This Court accepted the State's argument in
Raines that the purpose of the Maryland
DNA Collection Act is to identify
individuals, rather than to collect evidence.
While that may be true in the context of
maintaining a record of inmates, felons,
parolees, or probationers (as was the case
regarding the scope of the Act at the time
Raines was decided), in the present case,
identification is not what King's DNA
sample was used for or needed, and, in most
circumstances, will likely not be the case
with other arrestees. Solving cold cases, in
the State's view, is an ancillary benefit of
determining the proper identification of an
individual, but for King it was the only State

interest served by the collection of his DNA.
The State here cannot claim the same public
safety interests present in cases addressing
convicted felons, parolees, or probationers.
There is no interest in prison safety or
administration present.
Although we have recognized (and no one
can reasonably deny) that solving cold cases
is a legitimate government interest, a
warrantless, suspicionless search can not be
upheld by a "generalized interest" in solving
crimes.
Courts upholding statutes authorizing DNA
collection from arrestees rely on an
expansive definition of "identification" to
sweep-up "cold case" crime-solving as a
government purpose
recognized
and
approved previously by courts in other
contexts.
The State argues that it has a legitimate
purpose in identifying accurately arrestees.
Accepting this argument arg1lendo, the State
presented no evidence that it had any
problems whatsoever identifying accurately
King through traditional booking routines.
King had been arrested previously, given
earlier fingerprint samples, and been
photographed. There is no claim that King
presented false identification when arrested
or had altered his fingerprints or appearance
in any way that might increase the State's
legitimate interest in requiring an additional
form of identification to be certain who it
had arrested.
The State's purpOlied interests are made less
reasonable by the fact that DNA collection
can wait until a person has been convicted,
thus avoiding all of the threats to privacy
discussed in this opinion. DNA profiles do
not change over time (as far as science
"knows" at present), so there is no
reasonable argument that unsolved past or
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future crimes will go unresolved necessarily.
As regards to King's facial challenge to the
Act, a party challenging facially the
constitutionality of a statute "must establish
that no set of circumstances exist under
which the Act would be valid." In Salerno,
the Supreme Court set out, in dictum, the
"no set of circumstances" test that is used
broadly to decide facial constitutional
challenges; however, the over-arching
distinction between facial and as-applied
challenges, in the wake of Salerno, has been
less than clear. The Supreme Court, postSalerno, has not applied consistently the "no
set of circumstances" test to facial
challenges. Despite the unclear application
of Salerno among the federal courts, we
apply the test here according to Koshko. We
conclude that King's facial challenge to the
statute fails because there are conceivable,
albeit somewhat unlikely, scenarios where
an arrestee may have altered his or her
fingerprints or facial features (making
difficult or doubtful identification through
comparison to earlier fingerprints or
photographs on record) and the State may
secure the use of DNA samples, without a
warrant under the Act, as a means to identify
an arrestee, but not for investigatory
purposes, in any event.
As we conclude that the Maryland DNA
Collection Act, as applied to King as an
arrestee, was unconstitutional, and King's
10 April 2009 DNA sample was obtained
illegally, we must conclude that the second
DNA sample, obtained on 18 November
2009, pursuant to a court order based on
probable cause gained solely from the "hit"
from the first compelled DNA sample, is
suppressible also as a "fruit of the poisonous
tree." The "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine excludes evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Under
the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, the

defendant bears the burden of showing 1)
primary illegality and 2) "the cause and
effect relationship between the primary
illegality and the evidence in issue, to wit,
that the evidence was, indeed, the
identifiable fruit of that paJiicular tree."
Here, we have determined that the original
DNA collection was illegal. The cause-andeffect relationship between King's original
buccal swab and the court-ordered second
buccal swab is not attenuated in any way.
The first buccal swab provided the sole
probable cause for King's first-degree rape
grand jury indictment. There was no other
evidence linking King to the 2003 unsolved
rape. Were it not for the buccal swab
obtained illegally after King's assault arrest,
there would be no second DNA sample
which could have been used as evidence in
King's trial for the charges enumerated in
footnote seven, s1lpra. The DNA evidence
presented at trial was a fruit of the poisonous
tree.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for
Wicomico
County
reversed.
Case
remanded to that court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BARBERA
dissent.

and

WILNER,

Justices

I dissent. The Court decides today that the
police violated King's Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches,
when the police, after arresting King based
on probable cause that he had committed a
violent crime, took a DNA sample via a
buccal swab, pursuant to the Maryland DNA
Collection Act, Maryland Code (2003, 2011
RepI.Vol.), § 2-504(a)(3) of the Public
Safety Article (Act). The question, then, is
whether this warrantless search complied
with the strictures of the Fourth
Amendment, the touchstone for which is
"reasonableness." The test for asceliaining
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the answer to the reasonableness inquiry is
one adopted by the Supreme Court long ago,
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 20-21 (1968),
and followed by this Court ever since.
Under that test, whether a given warrantless
search is reasonable requires balancing the
privacy interests of the individual searched
against the legitimate government interests
promoted by the search. The test has been
employed to uphold searches of persons in
situations akin to the case at bar.
The majority recognizes that the balancing
test is the appropriate test to determine the
reasonableness,
and
hence
the
constitutionality, of the search at issue here.
Regrettably, both for the present case and all
other future cases like it, the majority's
application of the test to the circumstances
here could not be more wrong. Proper
analysis of the competing privacy and
governmental interests at stake exposes the
error.
To repeat, "reasonableness" depends on a
balance between the governmental interests
and the individual's right to personal
security free from arbitrary interference by
law officers. In assessing, first, the interests
at stake for King, I bear in mind that
consideration of the privacy interest
implicated by the buccal swab involves
identifying both the nature of the privacy
interest enjoyed by King at the time of the
swab and the character of the intrusion itself.
The majority misstates the degree to which
King's privacy was impinged by his arrest.
Certainly, up to the moment of conviction,
King enjoyed the presumption of innocence
in connection with the crimes charged. Yet
King's status as a presumed-innocent man
has little to do with the reduced expectation
of privacy attendant to his arrest, processing,
and pre-trial incarceration (even if for but a

short time). For purposes of the Fourth
Amendment analysis, King's privacy
expectation at the time of the cheek swab
was far more like a convicted felon,
probationer, and parolee than an uncharged
individual.
The majority's Fourth Amendment analysis
also suffers from its mislabeling the
character of the intrusion upon privacy and
bodily integrity occasioned by the cheek
swab, and the degree to which the arrestee's
privacy interest is impinged as a result of the
information obtained thereby. The buccal
swab technique has been described as
"perhaps the least intrusive of all seizures,"
and a "relatively noninvasive means of
obtaining DNA" that "pose[ s] lowered risk
for both the subject and laboratory
personnel."
Though surely a far more sophisticated and
"new" means of identification than
fingerprints, DNA analysis, when used
solely for purposes of identification is, in the
end, no different. Both are limited markers
that can reveal only identification
information.
In this way, the numbers of a DNA profile
are identical to the ridges of a fingerprintthe information derived from both is, as the
majority concedes, "related only to physical
characteristics and can be used to identify a
person, but no more."
The Supreme Court has given, albeit
impliedly, the constitutional "go ahead" for
the fingerprinting procedure. Given the
similarity of fingerprinting and the DNA
collection authorized by the Act, there is
little concern that the Act implicates a
weighty privacy interest.
On the other side of the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness balancing equation is the
412

State's interest in the use and retention of
DNA evidence. I need not discuss here the
significance of all the government interests
at stake, although there are at least three:
identifying arrestees, solving past crimes,
and exonerating innocent individuals.
We emphasized in Raines that identifying
perpetrators of crimes is a "compelling
governmental interest." In responding to this
strong law enforcement interest, the majority
eludes faithful application of the case law on
the subject of "identity," by carefully
circumscribing its meaning. The majority
reasons that "identity" includes only an
individual's name, age, address, and
physical characteristics, but does not include
"what [the] person has done." Based on this
reasoning, the majority notes that the
government can claim no legitimate interest
in identifying an individual for the purpose
of uncovering past misdeeds. From that
premise the majority holds that the Act is
unconstitutional as applied to King because
King's DNA collection was superfluous: the
identification interest already was served by
the fingerprinting and photographing of
King.
On the majority's first point, nothing in the
law supports the majority's restrictive
definition of identity. In the context of the
Fourth Amendment, the Supreme COUli has
made clear that law enforcement's interest in
identity extends to knowing whether a
person has been involved in crime. The
majority's definition raises the rhetorical
question: "Why law enforcement would
want to know a person's name, if not to
know whether that person is linked to

crime?"
On the second point, the majority essentially
holds that DNA collection cannot displace
traditional methods of identification because
those traditional methods are less intrusive
and in use effectively. The COUli of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit III Haskell
characterized such reasoning as "a Luddite
approach"
to
Fourth
Amendment
interpretation. "Nothing in the Constitution
compels us to . . . prevent the Government
from using this new and highly effective
tool [of identification] to replace (or
supplement) older ones." Moreover, the
Supreme Court has been clear in "repeatedly
refus[ing] to declare that only the 'least
intrusive' search practicable can be
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."
Finally, as this Court recognized in Raines,
"[i]t is not for us to weigh the advantages of
one method of identification over another."
Even assuming that the government's strong
interest in identifying perpetrators of crime
is the only interest at stake in this case
(which it is not), that interest, when
balanced
against
the
significantly
diminished expectation of privacy attendant
to taking a buccal swab of an arrestee,
yields, in my view, an obvious answer to the
question presented in this case. The swab of
King's inner cheek to extract material from
which 13 DNA "junk" loci are tested to
identify him is a reasonable search, and
FOUlih
therefore permitted
by the
Amendment. I therefore would affirm the
judgment of the Circuit COUli for Wicomico
County.
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"Chief Justice Lets Maryland Continue
to Collect DNA"
The New York Times
July 30,2012
Adam Liptak
Law enforcement officials in Maryland may
continue to collect DNA samples from
people charged with violent felonies while
the Supreme Court considers whether to
hear an appeal on the constitutionality of the
practice, Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.
ruled on Monday in a brief order granting a
stay of a state comi decision.
In April, the Maryland Court of Appeals, the
state's highest court, ruled that a state law
authorizing DNA collection from people
arrested but not yet convicted violated the
of
Fourth
Amendment's
prohibition
unreasonable searches and seizures.
The case arose from the collection of DNA
in 2009 from Alonzo Jay King Jr. after his
arrest on assault charges. The DNA profile
matched evidence from a 2003 rape, and he
was convicted of that crime.
The April decision overturned the rape
conviction. "King, as an arrestee, had an
expectation of privacy to be free from
warrantless searches of his biological
material," Judge Glenn T. Harrell Jr. wrote
for the majority.
In dissent, Judge Mary Ellen Barbera wrote
that collecting DNA "by rubbing and
rotating a cotton swab on the inside of an
individual's cheek" is much less intrusive
than searches that have been approved by
the Supreme Court, including routine strip
searches of people arrested for even minor
crimes and held in the general jail
population.

Chief Justice Roberts, recItmg the usual
standards for granting a stay of a lowercourt decision, said there was "a reasonable
probability" that the Supreme Court would
agree to hear the case. The Maryland
decision conflicted, he said, with ones from
the Virginia Supreme Court and federal
appeals courts in Philadelphia and San
Francisco.
He added that collecting DNA from people
accused of serious crimes is "an important
feature of day-to-day law enforcement
practice in approximately half the states and
the federal government."
The Maryland decision had consequences
beyond its borders, Chief Justice Roberts
wrote, because the samples the state
collected might have been provided to a
national database maintained by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. "The decision
renders the database less effective for other
states and the federal government," he
wrote.
There was a "fair prospect," Chief Justice
Roberts went on, that the Supreme Court
will ultimately reverse the Maryland
decision.
In the meantime, he said, the state would
suffer irreparable harm if it could not use "a
valuable tool for investigating unsolved
crimes and thereby helping to remove
violent offenders from the general
population.
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"DNA Sampling Case Develops"
SCOTUSblog
May 4,2012
Lyle Denniston
Maryland officials have set the stage for an
appeal to the Supreme Court to revive their
legal right to collect DNA samples from
individuals who have been arrested, but not
yet convicted of a crime-if the
state's highest court cannot be persuaded to
reconsider its partial ban on that procedure.
The issue has divided lower federal and state
cOUlis, and the case of King v. Maryland
would appear to pose the issue in a simple
and direct way-a rape conviction would
fall, and getting a guilty verdict at a new
trial could be in considerable doubt.
State Attorney General Douglas F. Gansler
asked the state comi at least to put its ruling
on hold until after it could be tested in the
Supreme Court.
Maryland's DNA sampling law was
originally passed in 1994, but was extended
in 2008 to require sampling of those arrested
and not yet convicted. The federal
government and 25 of the 50 states have
similar laws, and disputes over their
constitutionality have arisen across the
country. The Supreme Comi on March 19
refused to hear a case involving a challenge
to a DNA sample taken from a Pennsylvania
man (Mitchell v. United States, docket 117603), but the sample was not used in that
case to identify the individual as the
perpetrator of a different crime.
Among the constitutional issues that have
arisen over such DNA sampling laws, these
are some of the most significant:

* What level of privacy do arrested
individuals have, compared to those actually

found guilty of crimes?

* How

intrusive is a DNA sample, both in
terms of the physical procedure of swabbing
inside the mouth, and in terms of the amount
of private information gathered by such a
swab?

* Do constitutional limits on it apply both to
the original swabbing, and also to the later
interpretation of the personal markers
found?
* For constitutional purposes, is using the
DNA result to tie an individual to other
crimes simply another form of identification,
or is it a form of investigation of another
crime? (In other words, can such a sample
be used constitutionally only if it helps
identify that arrested individual as the
person the police want for that particular
crime, or can it also be used validly to link
that individual to other crimes, such as
unsolved offenses ("cold cases")?
* Is the constitutional equation different if a
sampling law puts strict limits on what
information from a sample may be used by
prosecutors? (In other words, is there no
constitutional problem if the sample reveals
only what are called "junk" factors that
really do not tell much about an individual's
biological profile?)
* And, if such a sampling procedure is
invalid in some particular factual situations,
may it remain on the books for other
situations? (In other words, should such a
law be struck down as written-that is,
facially-or only as applied to specific
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scenarios?)
Maryland's highest court upheld the state's
DNA sampling law in 2004, but only as it
applied to those already convicted of serious
crimes (felonies). But, in a 5-2 decision on
April 24, the state tribunal found that the
law could not be applied in the specific case
of a Wicomico County man, Alonzo Jay
King, Jr., and thus overturned his conviction
for rape-a convIctIOn that depended
heavily upon a link to him provided by a
DNA sample taken after his arrest earlier for
a separate assault case. (The state court
turned down King's plea to strike down the
law as written-that is, his "facial"
challenge to it; it said there might be
instances where the sample could be validly
used when an arrested person's identity
might be in question.)
Under the state cOUli ruling, King can be
prosecuted at a new trial, but Attorney
General Gansler has told the state cOUli, in
his reconsideration motion, that the DNA
sample that the ruling bars as evidence is
"the strongest piece of evidence linking"
King to a rape. After his conviction for rape,
King was sentenced to life in prison without
parole.
King had been arrested in 2009 for an
assault that was treated as a violent crime.
Because of that designation of his alleged
offense, state law required that, upon his
arrest, a DNA sample be taken by using a
cotton swab inside his mouth to collect
cellular material. That was done when he
was booked into the Wicomico County jail.
He also was identified by photograph and by
his fingerprints. He was later convicted of
second-degree assault, and was given a fouryear prison sentence, with three of those
years suspended.
Later, scientific interpretation of that sample

linked King to a rape that occurred in
September 2003. In that incident, which had
remained a "cold case" for prosecutors, a
53-year-old woman was raped by an
African-American man whom she could not
otherwise identify. The intruder held a gun
to the woman's head as he assaulted her.
Later, a semen sample taken from her body
was found, though a DNA database, to
match the DNA sample taken from King
during the arrest procedure in 2009. After
his conviction, King challenged the use of
the 2009 sample as evidence against him in
the rape case.
In agreeing with his challenge, as the
sampling law applied to him specifically, the
state cOUli majority ruled that arrested
individuals have a higher level of privacy
than those who have actually been
convicted, that the sample in King's case
was not necessary to identify him in the
assault case and thus was used only as a
basis for investigating him in the earlier rape
incident, that an arrested individual's
expectation of privacy in private biological
information outweighed the state's interest
in gathering information to solve other
crimes, and that DNA sampling is more
intrusive than merely taking a suspect's
fingerprints so the long-standing legal
permission to use fingerprint evidence did
not control in the DNA context.
The state court majority said that its
"analysis is influenced by the precept that
the
government
must
overcome a
presumption that warrantless, suspicionless
searches are per se unreasonable . . . . The
state bears the burden of overcoming the
arrestee's presumption of innocence and his
expectation to be free from biological
searches. . .. " It found that the expectation
of privacy was greater for an arrestee than
for a convicted person, and that the state had
not overcome that privacy claim by its
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interest in investigating other crimes.
The two dissenting judges argued that the
majority had overstated the privacy interests
of those arrested and detained in police
stations. And, they concluded, the
government's interest in solving crimes far
outweighed any such privacy interests. A
swab of the mouth to pick up cells, the
dissenters said, is "perhaps the least
intrusive of all seizures" by police.
The dissenters also accused the majority of
exaggerating the amount of biological
information that could be exposed by using
a DNA sample to get a "hit" to help solve
another crime. The state law at issue, the
dissenting opinion said, puts strict limits on
the use of DNA information, and the kind
that can be used in criminal cases is only the

kind of "junk" data that does not disclose
"intimate genetic information." What a
DNA sample shows, the dissent said, is
vitiually identical to the ridges of a
fingerprint that can only be used to identify
a specific person, and nothing more.
The state attorney general, in asking the
Court of Appeals to reconsider its ruling, or
at least to stay it pending an appeal to the
Supreme Court, said that the decision could
affect state prosecutors' use of evidence that
could help solve "190 unsolved cases."
Moreover, that motion contended, DNA
sampling is used not only to solve unsolved
crimes, but also helps to exonerate those
who have been convicted in error and helps
to eliminate other suspects III an
investigation.
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"Highest Court in Maryland Bans Collection of
DNA at Certain Crime Scenes"
AFRO
May 2,2012
Alexis Taylor
Police depmiments across Maryland were
ordered to stop collecting DNA from
suspects of certain crimes last week, the
result of a ruling in the state's highest court,
the Maryland COUli of Appeals.

before he was convicted
Though the evidence
obtain, it will still
investigators after the
have been followed.

The ban applies to cases involving attempted
or committed violent crimes and burglaries,
which voids part of the amendments made in
2008 to the Maryland DNA Collection Act.
That law previously allowed suspects, not
just convicted criminals, to have their DNA
taken and saved in a database for use in later
crimes.

"The court says you can still get the DNA,
provided you take your facts to a neutral and
detached magistrate, i.e. a judge, and get a
warrant. In order to get a warrant you're
going to have to persuade the judge that this
DNA is evidence of a certain crime," said
University of Baltimore, School of Law
Professor, Byron Warnken.

"What the police departments were doing
was taking this DNA and stockpiling it
when there's no probable cause for the
extraction of the DNA. That is highly
unconstitutional in terms of individual rights
and illegal search and seizure," said
Baltimore attorney, A. Dwight Petit, who's
been practicing general law since 1973.

Police departments are not in complete
agreement with the ruling, but are adhering
to the order, while Attorney General
Douglas F. Gansler has already requested a
stay of the decision.

"In dealing with a very, very conservative
Supreme Court, it is good to see that our
state cOUli is adhering to some of the
Constitutional protections which we as
citizens deserve. It was a very Constitutional
ruling."
The ban stems from the Alonzo Jay King J1'.
v. State of Maryland case, which highlighted
fourth amendment rights against illegal
search and seizures. King's DNA was taken
from him in a 2009 assault arrest. That DNA
became key in connecting King to a 2003
rape, a connection he says would never have
been made had his DNA not been taken

of the 2009 assault.
will be harder to
be available to
proper procedures

"The court's decision thereby undermines
important public safety objectives," said
Gansler in his motion submitted May 1,
asking the Maryland Court of Appeals to
reconsider the decision before the Supreme
Court is petitioned.
"The 2008 amendments have bolstered law
enforcement efforts and have led to the
apprehension of violent criminals who
committed crimes that might otherwise have
gone unsolved."
Gansler also said that while the 2008
amendments could bring an end to nearly
190 unsolved cases, the DNA evidence
collected also helps exonerate prisoners
wrongly accused.
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Whatever the effects
Maryland State

of the

Police say their main focus
citizens out of harm's way.

IS

reversal,

arrest," said Elena Russo, a spokesperson for
the Maryland State Police DepaItment.

keeping

"Our job is public safety and DNA
collection is a tool. The effects are still to be
determined," said Russo, when asked if the
ruling will help or hurt officials pursuing
justice in the future.

"We're still able to collect upon conviction,
what's been halted is collection upon
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"Court of Appeals Holding Could Stop Arrestee DNA Collection
by State and Local Governments"
Maryland Association of C01lnties
April 27, 2012
Since the passage of the 2008 Maryland
DNA Collection Act, it has been a common
practice for State and local law enforcement
and correctional agencies to take a DNA
sample from arrestees charged with a violent
crime or felony burglary. However, an April
24 Maryland Court of Appeals decision in
King v. State of Maryland, has held that
taking a DNA sample from an arrestee
violates the arrestee's FOUlih Amendment
right against unreasonable warrantless
searches. The ruling has put law
enforcement and correctional agencies in a
quandary about whether to continue the
practice pending appeal.
As reported by an April 25 Baltimore Sun
article, some State and local jurisdictions
have decided to continue the practice while
the State decides whether to appeal the case.
Several law enforcement agencies, including
the state Department of Public Safety and
Correctional Services, were awaiting a
decision on whether the state will appeal
before they make changes. Gov. Matiin
O'Malley, Baltimore's mayor and a chorus
of state and local officials called for an
appeal of what they see as a crucial tool that
has linked suspects to other, unsolved
cnmes.
Opponents of the practice said the decision
to continue taking samples shows disregard
for the Court of Appeals and the laws the
police are sworn to uphold ....
O'Malley was joined by Baltimore Mayor
Police
Stephanie
Rawlings-Blake,
Commissioner Frederick H. Bealefeld III

and others in pushing Attorney General
Douglas Gansler to file a challenge before
the U.S. Supreme Court. ...
In Anne Arundel and Baltimore counties,
police officials said they would not change
their practices until the state police or
Gansler's office told them otherwise; in
Howard County and Baltimore City, the
samples are collected by the state public
safety department, which will continue to do
so.
It remained unclear what will happen to the
nearly 16,000 samples already collected in a
database, although a public defender said
suspects whose DNA has been compiled
may be able to take court action to get the
samples destroyed ....
The collection of DNA at arrest has been the
subject of national debate, because
opponents point out that it takes place before
a suspect is tried in court. Twenty-six states
have laws similar to Maryland's, and many
have been upheld in state and federal court.
An April 25 Baltimore Sun editorial urges
the State to appeal to decision. The editorial
notes that the Maryland Court of Appeals
has upheld in the past the taking of
fingerprints from arrestees and the postconviction collection of DNA.
The crux of the matter is this: Those charged
with crimes have, for decades, been
fingerprinted as a matter of routine, and
those fingerprints are checked against
evidence both in the crime at hand and in
unsolved crimes. The use of DNA is more
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powerful
and
more
technologically
advanced, but it is fundamentally the same
thing. We hope the Supreme Court will be

given the chance to recognize that fact and
uphold Mr. King's conviction-and the law
that made it possible.
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"Police Power to Use Stun Guns Left Unclear"
SCO TUSb log
May 29, 2012
Lyle Denniston

The Supreme Court, choosing not to review
a compromise decision of a federal appeals
court, on Tuesday left police around the
nation with no final guidance on the legality
of their use of a Taser-a device that can
stun an unruly or disobedient suspect into
immobility, or at least inflict a considerable
amount of temporary pain. Without
comment, the Justices turned aside four
separate petitions, raising both sides of the
issue: whether such stun guns' use is a kind
of excessive force by police in violation of
the Fourth Amendment, and whether police
are entitled to legal immunity for their past
use of such a device.
The Court's action settles nothing on either
question. Thus, police in various parts of the
country will have to check what the federal
or state courts in their area have ruled on the
subject-if they have. As of now, the lower
cOUlis are split on the constitutionality of
Taser technology as a method of police
control.
In Tuesday's orders, the Court voted to
leave intact a Ninth Circuit Court ruling
declaring that it violates the Fourth
Amendment to use a Taser to subdue a
suspect, at least when the crime the police
are investigating is not a serious one, the
suspect does not pose an immediate threat to
the safety of officers or bystanders, and the

suspect is not "actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest" by fleeing.
Those are not exclusive factors, though, the
Circuit Court said, and, in fact, it found the
use of a Taser was excessive even in one
case where the suspect did mildly resist
arrest.
In one case before the Circuit Court, police
officers in Seattle used three quick bursts of
a Taser (in the non-demobilizing mode) to
subdue a pregnant woman who had been
stopped for driving too fast near a school. In
the other case, police officers in Maui,
Hawaii, used a stun gun in its strongest
mode to disable a woman involved in a
domestic dispute with her husband. In each
case, the Circuit Court ruled that the use of
the technology, in the specific circumstances
of the two cases, was "unreasonable" in a
Fourth Amendment sense.
But, the Circuit Court went on to conclude
that the FOUlih Amendment right was not
clearly established at the time of these two
incidents-November 2004 in the Seattle
incident, August 2006 in the Maui incident.
The Justices, without comment, denied
review of Daman v. Brooks (11-898),
Agarano v. Mattos (11-1032), Brooks v.
Daman (11-1045), and Mattos v. Agarano
(11-1165) ....
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"Ninth Circuit Lays Out Constitutional
Limits on Use of Tasers"
Metropolitan News-Enterprise
October 18, 2011
The use of tasers to subdue persons
suspected of minor offenses is subject to
constitutional limits on the use of excessive
force, the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled yesterday.
A sharply divided en banc panel of the court
reversed two district court rulings that were
argued together and consolidated for
decision. The district judge in each instance
ruled that the plaintiff had presented
sufficient evidence for the case to go
forward under 42 U.S.c. Sec. 1983, but the
appellate court said the officers in both cases
were protected by qualified immunity.
In a case from Seattle, a six-judge majority
held that a seven-months pregnant woman
tasered three times after a traffic stop had
shown a prima facie violation of the Fourth
Amendment, but that the law at the time of
the 2004 incident was too unsettled for the
plaintiff to show a violation of a clearly
established right. Four judges said the
plaintiff's bizarre conduct and refusal to
follow instructions gave the officers no
reasonable alternative to using the amount of
force that they did.
The decision was a partial victory for
plaintiff Malaika Brooks, however. Because
the "clearly established right" analysis does
not apply under Washington state law, the
court held, she has a viable claim for assault
and battery.

Maui Case
In the second case, from Maui, the same

seven judges similarly concluded that a
woman who allegedly interfered with police
as they attempted to arrest her intoxicated
husband for attacking her should not have
been tasered without warning, but that the
officer was entitled to qualified immunity.
Two of the other judges argued that Jayzel
Mattos, like Brooks, left the officers devoid
of reasonable alternatives to using the
electric devices. But two judges who
approved of the officer's conduct in Brooks'
case argued that Mattos was entitled to a
trial to determine whether the officer who
tasered her in August 2006 breached
constitutional standards that were wellestablished at that time.
The panel that decided the cases consisted of
10 judges, due to the recent death of Judge
Pamela Ann Rymer.
Judge Richard A. Paez, wrItmg for the
majority, explained that Brooks was cited
for speeding in a school zone after dropping
off her l1-year-old for class. After refusing
to sign the citation, she became involved in
a heated argument, apparently because she
disbelieved the officer's explanation that
signing meant only that she acknowledged
receipt and was not an admission of guilt.
After she reiterated to an arriving sergeant
that she would not sign the citation, she was
told she was going to jail. After she told the
officers she was due to give birth in less
than 60 days, and after an officer threatened
her with the taser, she testified, an officer
opened the driver's side door and twisted

423

her arm up behind her back, then removed
the keys-which dropped to the floor-from
her ignition.

Fourteenth amendments, but all claims
except those relating to the use of the taser
were dismissed by the district judge.

Another officer then applied the taser,
drive-stun mode, to her left thigh.

Paez concluded that in Brooks' case,
viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, the district judge
was correct in concluding that there was
sufficient evidence of excessive force. The
violation, he reasoned, was relatively minor;
there was no immediate threat to the safety
of the officers or the public, at least not after
the keys were removed from the ignition;
and Brooks was not actively resisting or
attempting to evade arrest.

In

In drive-stun mode, the taser is applied to
the subject's body; it is a pain-compliance
technique and is not intended to incapacitate
the subject. In dart-mode, by contrast, the
of
taser
fires
electrodes
capable
incapacitating the subject by interrupting the
ability of the brain to control the muscles in
the body.
Brooks-who was convicted of failing to
sign the ticket, but not of resisting arrestsought damages for her injuries, including
permanent burn scars.
Domestic Call
In Mattos' case, the testimony was that
police responded to the family residence
after the couple's 14-year-old daughter
called 911. Mattos claimed that she was
trying to calm the situation, and avoid
disturbing a younger child who was
sleeping, when Officer Ryan Aikala moved
toward her husband with her in the middle.
She claimed that the officer pushed up
against her chest, and that she extended her
arm to protect her breasts "from being
smashed against" the officer's body. The
officer then accused her of touching him,
and as she tried to reason with another
officer, she claimed, Aikala shot her with
the taser in dart-mode.
All charges against Mattos and her husband
were ultimately dropped. She and her
husband alleged in their complaint that the
warrantless entry into their residence and
their arrests violated the FOUlih, Fifth, and

There was, he added, no reason for the
officer to use the taser against Brooks three
times within a span of less than a minute. He
also concluded, however, that Brooks is
without a federal remedy because at the
time, there was no Ninth Circuit law on the
use of tasers and federal courts in other
circuits had uniformly held that the use of
the taser did not constitute a constitutional
violation.
With respect to Mattos, Paez noted that the
only offense she was accused of was
interfering with the officer, that any such
interference was-according to her version
of the facts-relatively minor, that the
officers could not have considered her a
threat, and that while the situation was
volatile, there was no evidence "that tasing
the innocent wife of a large, drunk, angry
man when there is no threat that either
spouse has a weapon, is a prudent way to
defuse a potentially, but not yet, dangerous
situation. "
The lack of a warning, he added, "pushes
this use of force far beyond the pale."
But in concluding that Mattos, like Brooks,
cannot pierce the police claim of qualified
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immunity, Paez explained that as of August
2006, there was still no federal appellate
case law holding the use of the taser
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, he
said, has made it clear that a court cannot
find a right to be clearly established without
support in Supreme COUli or federal
appellate precedent.
Paez was joined by Judges Susan P. Graber,
M. Margaret McKeown, Raymond C.
Fisher, and Johnnie B. Rawlinson.
Judge Mary M. Schroeder concurred
"the
nonseparately,
emphasizing
threatening nature of the plaintiffs'
conduct," in contrast with the danger posed
by tasering, particularly the risk to Brooks'
child, although the child was ultimately born
healthy.
Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, joined by Judge
Carlos Bea, argued that the majority failed
to appreciate the difficulty of police work
and the superiority of the taser to other
means of subduing suspects that are more
dangerous to both the officer and the
suspect.
The officers in Brooks' case, he wrote, acted
in a way that was "entirely reasonable,"
"were endlessly patient," and deserved

"commendations for grace under fire." The
plaintiff, he said, "is completely, wholly,
100 percent at fault" because she "risked
harm to herself, her unborn daughter and
three police officers because she got her
dander up over a traffic ticket."
Kozinski acknowledged that Mattos' case
was "considerably closer," but argued that
the decision to use the taser was reasonable
in the context in which the officer found
himself, the need to make a split-second
judgment under a difficult and fast-moving
situation.
Judge Barry Silverman, joined by Judge
Richard Clifton, joined Kozinski's analysis
of the Brooks case, but said the district
judge was correct in finding that Mattos had
a triable case. "Precedent already on the
books in August 2006 provided officers and
cOUlis with enough guidance to know that a
taser in dati mode is not a toy and presents a
level of force on par with other implements
'used to subdue violent or aggressive
persons. ",
Pasadena attorney John Burton authored an
amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs.
The cases are Mattos v. Agarano, 08-15567,
and Brooks v. Daman, 08-35536.
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"Police Use of Stun Guns May Increase"
The Sun
June 10, 2008
Sarah Garland

The New York City Police Department
could expand greatly its use of electric stun
guns, as Commissioner Raymond Kelly said
yesterday he is prepared to accept
recommendations from a new report spurred
by the 2006 Sean Bell shooting.

Yet the commissioner also noted that the use
of Tasers in New York has been limited in
the past because they have been known to
cause deaths.

The report, by a nonpartisan, Californiabased think tank, RAND Corp., was
commissioned last year by Mr. Kelly to
examine police firearms training.

The guns shoot out metal barbs that lodge in
the skin of suspects and the models used by
the police department have the capacity to
transmit 5,000 volts of electricity into the
human body, according to Taser spokesman
Steve Tuttle.

Although mostly laudatory, the report listed
more than 100 recommendations for
improvements, including more hands-on
instruction and stricter standards for how
police are taught to handle their weapons.
The most prominent-and most likely to rile
police critics-was a recommendation that
the depatiment launch a pilot study to
examine whether its more than 27,000
uniformed officers on patrol should be
armed with stun guns.
Of 455 police shootings examined for the
report, researchers found 25-three of them
fatal-where a stun gun may have diffused
the situation.
"The expansion of the use of Tasers may
well be in order," the report's lead author,
Bernard Rostker, said at a news conference
yesterday announcing the findings.
The police depatiment had already
announced it is deploying 500 Tasers to
sergeants on patrol staliing tomorrow, and
Mr. Kelly said he was open to expanding the
program.

"They're controversial," he said.

In its other main recommendation, the report
called for rolling enrollment for the police
academy, instead of the current system of
two large classes of recruits a year, so that
recruits can have more chances to practice
firearms training.
Police officials said a new police academy
due to open in the next few years would
allow the police depatiment to apply many
of the report's training recommendations.
The report was originally billed as a sixmonth study of the NYPD's firearms
training that would include a look at
"contagious shooting" after Bell, an
unarmed black man, was killed in a hail of
50 police bullets.
But on the subject of contagious firingwhen police officers fire reflexively, often in
response to the sounds of guns going off
around them-the report said it had been
nearly impossible to tabulate whether
incidents had risen or fallen in recent years.
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"It's a very rare event," Mr. Rostker said.
The associate legal director at the New York
Civil Liberties Union, Chris Dunn, criticized
the report's treatment of contagious
shootings as cursory, and also questioned its
lack of a systematic analysis of the ethnic
makeup of shooting victims and firing
officers.
"It's really silent on the issues that the Bell
shooting raised," Mr. Dunn said.

Mr. Rostker called the omission of race and
ethnicity "an oversight," adding that he was
"sorry about that."
Mr. Kelly said the issue of race was not in
the purview of the report.
"This was study was focused on what we
could do. It was not a panacea; it wasn't
going to solve all issues," he said.
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"Shoot to Stun"
The New York Times
July 2, 2008
Paul Robinson

A narrowly divided Supreme Court ruled
last week that the Second Amendment gives
Americans the right to keep a loaded gun at
home for their personal use. Presumably,
citizens can use these weapons to defend
themselves from intruders. But given the
growing effectiveness and availability of
less lethal weapons, it is likely that state
laws will increasingly keep people from
actually using their guns for self-defense.
The states impose carefully defined
limitations on the use of deadly force in selfdefense. (These rules are fairly uniform,
state to state; most are based on the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code
of 1962.) A person may use only as much
force as is "immediately necessary." If a less
lethal means of defense is available, the use
of deadly force is illegal. Firearms are by
law deadly force. (The police are given
somewhat greater authority to use force,
even aggressive force.)
Guns have been considered a primary
weapon for self-defense. But now there are
nonlethal alternatives-some not yet on the
market-that can quickly disable an attacker
even more reliably than a firearm can.
The best known of these are Tasers,
handgun-shaped devices that fire a dart that
delivers a painful electrical shock. A hit
from a Taser causes an instant muscular
spasm that can disable any attacker, no
matter how determined. And the Taser
works no matter where on the attacker's
body the dart hits. A bullet, in contrast,
instantly disables only if it hits a couple of
vulnerable spots, like the space between the

eyes. A shot to the arm, the leg or even the
torso may not stop an attacker.
A Taser works only within a limited
distance, up to 35 feet for advanced models.
But most firearm confrontations are at less
than 10 feet. More important, the legal
limitations on self-defense typically do not
allow use of force at a distance. Defensive
force is considered "immediately necessary"
only when the defender can wait no longer,
when the threat is "imminent."
Newer kinds of hand-held weapons that are
less lethal than guns-many already in
prototype-may be even more effective than
Tasers. These include light lasers, designed
to blind temporarily, and microwave beams
that instantly cause the skin to feel as if it is
on fire, but cause no lasting harm.
Of course, anyone who uses a gun in selfdefense may argue that he would have used
a less lethal weapon if he had had one at
hand, but there was only the firearm. The
problem with this argument is that the
limited option is the person's choice, and the
law may not be blind to that choice.
If you are a surgeon and you leave your
glasses behind on the way to the operating
room, then botch a delicate procedure, you
can't convince a judge that the resulting
death wasn't your fault because you couldn't
see well. If, on your way to confront an
intruder, you choose your gun rather than
your more effective but less lethal weapon,
you can hardly complain later about your
limited options.
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Similarly, when a person shops for a weapon
of self-defense, anticipating some day a
confrontation with an attacker, his choice of
a gun over something less lethal but more
effective is a choice to limit his options in a
confrontation.
Should we worry that by expecting people to
use only nonlethal weapons in self-defense
we would sacrifice our personal autonomy
and safety? No. On the contrary, personal
autonomy would be even more vigilantly
protected.
The reason for this is a second limitation on
the use of defensive force, what might be
called the "proportionality" requirement.

Typically, a defender can lawfully use
deadly force only to prevent death, rape,
kidnapping or bodily injury serious enough
to cause long-term loss or impairment of a
body part or organ. But a nondeadly weapon
can be used to defend against any threat of
unlawful force.
As effective less-than-Iethal weapons
proliferate, the laws of self-defense may
ultimately relegate last week's court
decision to the status of an odd little
opinion, one that works mainly to ensure
some special constitutional status for
gunpowder technology. Gun collectors will
be fond of it, but for most of society, it will
have little practical effect.
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